Speeches

Mr President, the Republic of Moldova has had challenging times in this unprecedented crisis. Combined with the effects of the Russian war of aggression that raised energy and commodity prices, it has all had a detrimental impact on Moldova. Hence, the EU’s help and assistance are crucial in this situation. The country certainly needs its reforms improving decentralisation, crucial reforms considering concerning the institutional set—up of the public administration and resilience against state capture. At the same time, the Moldovan Government has been eager to continue to work on its reform, and to have the EU in close integration and sectoral cooperation. The Moldovan citizens spoke, and chose to deepen European relations. We need to support our friends in the Eastern Partnership, and that is why we should highly endorse granting the candidate’s request, based on merit.

Mr President, dear colleagues, this House started to draft a regulation on trade in spyware eight years ago. I had the honour of being the one to conclude the dual—use regulation on behalf of Parliament, where we achieved unprecedented transparency on spyware exports. Allow me to address Mr Tarczyński, who lacks information apparently on this, because actually do you know why it is that after eight years this has been brought into the plenary finally and we vote on it – thanks to Germany, thanks to the German Presidency. Because of FinFisher, they prioritised it and that’s why we have this amazing piece of legislation. So tell me, what did Poland and Hungary do apart from blocking this regulation and apart from using this spyware? Thanks to that, the European Commission is now obliged to publish what spyware was exported from the EU, and we know that Pegasus and similar spyware was being sold via EU—based sister companies in Bulgaria, Cyprus or Luxembourg. So it seems our export control lacks control. How are we as the European Union answering this blatant security hole? How has the EEAS secured its infrastructure against such intrusions? And what will it take for us to finally sanction companies like NSO? I hope that sitting in one room with those affected today will be the deal—breaker.

Mr President, I’ve seen many, many people cheer on the ‘hactivist’ group Anonymous when they wage their own war against Russians. When some of my friends travelled to Ukraine to help Ukrainians flee the country, others sit down behind a computer and show their heroism through ones and zeros. The same goes to other entities. Ukraine built resilient cyber defence capabilities. The UK and US support Ukraine with their cyber mission teams. We are, however, nowhere to be seen in this field, even though each day I open the news, I see several new cyber attacks in Europe. That brings the question: will our citizens have to hope that Anonymous will have the capacities to cover them too? Or are we prepared to protect our critical infrastructure, data and information space? My friends are nice and I am sure they will help if needed, but this is our political responsibility as long, as we support democracy that is.

Mr President, in many ways we know even less of what is happening in North Korea today, since the country has completely shut its borders using the COVID pandemic as a pretext. What we do know is that the humanitarian situation of the population has worsened on average and that starvation and famine are a growing reality. We also know who is keeping Kim’s head above water: the neighbour who profits from a divided Korean peninsula and the human trafficking of desperate Koreans. The regime continues to evade embargoes and sanctions only through massive economic support by China, with which it conducts most of its trade. In order to help the people in North Korea, to allow food and humanitarian aid to arrive where it’s needed and to let independent UN observers enter the country, the EU must use its economic leverage with China. That is, if we are serious about North Korea and its citizens.

Madam President, dear colleagues, and unfortunately not Mr Borrell. After this summit, the Chinese leadership has shown to be in a dilemma. It intends to continue the extremely profitable economic relationship it has with us in the EU in order to keep its economy out of recession. At the same time, China signals support for Putin and his war in order to balance against NATO. China is also the country, if I may remind you, which believes that it can bully one of our Member States into submission with a mix of economic and diplomatic coercion and secondary sanctions. Even before Putin shattered a long-loved fairy tale of the ‘change through trade’, the EU found it harder and harder to cooperate with authoritarian regimes that break international law on a daily basis. We must do our part to make it clear to Chinese policy planners that this double game is not going to work. Our economic anti-coercion instrument comes at a very timely moment for this – designing it to be quickly applicable and veto-proofing against single Member States should be our goal – not just to help China decide which side it is on, but to signal to all authoritarian regimes that they either play by common rules or that they will stop profiting from our export market, our technology and our investment and trade. I will thank you once this is done.

Madam President, I tried to catch the eye, but I was unsuccessful so I will waste a little bit of my precious seconds to just remind a few of my colleagues that the MFA so very important for Moldova is not related to the refugee crisis and to the war. Thank you. And as for the remarks I promised on the Commission and our role, first, I still stress the need for the Commission to include policy reforms into the memorandum, such as addressing asset recovery linked to 2014 bank fraud, continued public-finance management reforms, the justice sector reform, enhancing transparency, accountability, etc. And I emphasised that each instalment disbursement should be linked to clear conditions. Secondly, I want to note that it is shameful that the European Parliament does not enjoy an adequate role in the MFA process, despite being a co-legislator. MFA is assent with urgency and as a consequence the EP cannot have proper scrutiny. Furthermore, the political conditionalities are agreed only between the Commission and the recipient country in the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding, where the Parliament has no say. That is why I need to stress to the Commission that the European Parliament must get duly informed throughout the disbursement of the MFA programme. You should monitor and rigorously control the fulfilment of these conditions and inform us throughout the whole MFA process. Thirdly, the MFA combination of loans and grants, where loans usually have the most significant share, is not that favourable. Currently, Moldova is seeing the impact of war, raised energy prices and some additional costs. Thus I welcome the Commission’s efforts to find also some other ways to support Moldova in stabilising the economy and facing the new unprecedented challenges. The macro-financial assistance is not already sufficient to cover the financial gaps, so this would be very important.

Mr President, in the last few years, the Republic of Moldova has faced an exceptional triple crisis, namely the COVID—19 pandemic, the energy crisis and the prevalent fight against systemic corruption and nepotism that caused significant weaknesses in several sectors, including limited administrative capacity. While Moldova is still one of the poorest countries in Europe, the economic recovery plan for Moldova can be an essential stimulus for mitigating the effects of the pandemic, the energy crisis and state weaknesses, while also creating the changes needed to make Moldova more efficient and resilient to coming changes, which will be more than plenty. Currently, there is tremendous potential for necessary reforms, which would be a shame to miss. Even though Moldova has already taken some reform measures to combat corruption, organised crime and illicit financial flows, there are still significant opportunities for strengthening, notably in democratic institutions, improving decentralisation and implementation of crucial reforms concerning the institutional set—up of the public administration. Moreover, the critical state institutions in Moldova also need to be strengthened to make them more resilient against capture, which has been problematic. Developing a rigorous framework to preserve judicial independence, integrity and accountability is critical to addressing corruption and reducing routes for political influence, sowing more trust in the legal system and improving access and delivery to justice. The proposed EUR 150 million macro-financial assistance (MFA) operation for Moldova is foreseen to be disbursed in three equal tranches to be released between 2022 and 2024, with the first tranche disbursement envisaged before the summer. The financial programming over the 2022—2024 period allows for a grant component of EUR 32 million to be financed from the available budget. The proposal for MFA to Moldova is provided as an integral part of international support for the economic stabilisation of the Republic of Moldova. As usual, the disbursements would be conditional on satisfactory reviews under the IMF programme and progress on implementing the EU—Moldova Association Agreement and the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). In the light of all the considerations at this plenary, I believe that the European Parliament should agree with the Committee on International Trade (INTA) to approve the Commission’s proposal to provide micro-financial assistance to Moldova. It is essential to consider the whole picture. The Republic of Moldova is following a good reform trajectory, even though some spheres still need to be strengthened, the right conditions are presently fulfilled for our support. I will address the Commission in my final remarks, but allow me to stress also at this point the need for the Commission to include policy reforms into the memorandum of understanding and to ensure clear conditions. Given the current situation in Europe, I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the Republic of Moldova for taking care of the refugees from Ukraine fleeing the Russian aggression war, despite the fact that it has its complications for such a small nation.

Mr President, in many ways, Putin’s war has changed everything, but it has also reinforced what we found in our over a year—long investigation into malicious interference. Dictators exploit our untransparent financing and lobbyism laws to buy themselves into our political system. Dictators buy our state—of—the—art intrusion software to spy on anyone who could expose their crimes and corruption anywhere in the world. Dictators spread their propaganda through purely profit—driven social networks and corporations that we Europeans fail to regulate. Russia’s naked aggression has united us and created the necessary common threat to hopefully enforce many of the recommendations in the report to counter these vulnerabilities. For me, it is clear that only a common European approach that combines the strengths and resources of all Member States can be successful, especially in the realm of cybersecurity, protection of critical infrastructures, regulation of online platforms and expert control of high—tech goods. Our long—term strategy must be a whole-of-society response to educate and prepare our citizens for the digital age by dedicating more time and resources to those members of civil society who strengthen and protect our common freedoms. I admit that I am worried about our large potential for overreaction. Nobody wants a European Patriot Act. Mass censorship, mandated backdoors and eradication of secure communication cannot be our answer to increasing geopolitical hostility because they threaten the foundations of our free societies. With this report, I believe we start to walk in a good direction. We might stumble, we might miss a step, but, finally, we walk.

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, we are meeting in this plenary on a date that many have speculated in the last week as a day of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Not only people who have experienced war, but also those who would like to miss this experience in their lives, clench their throats with such a possibility. If we look at the list of security threats over the past few years, we would look in vain for incidents that would not be an aggression of the Russian Federation. Georgia. Ukraine. Spying scandals, assassinations on European soil or disinformation campaigns, we find Kremlin manuscripts everywhere. Whatever direction the current tensions develop, it must be remembered that Russia has long been waging a war with European states, using methods other than traditional ones. And he wins. It succeeds in dividing – it remains to be ruled. We must unite and focus on both the short-term threats and the long-term effects of the Kremlin's actions. Otherwise, we'll lose without a fight.

Madam President, I want to focus on two issues in the report that I believe are of structural importance to our security. Firstly, qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council. A flexible and credible operational system is necessary. The Council should start with the low—hanging fruit on this, and introduce QMV in the adoption of statements on international human rights issues and human rights—related decisions. Then we can continue towards QMV for the introduction of sanctions. Our credibility as one acting block is at stake if we allow the unanimity vote system to paralyse us. Secondly, the ever—growing threat of cyber surveillance. New spyware revelations are continuing to threaten our very political basis, and allow incumbent parties to spy on their opposition. The damage is being done to our national and European institutions from an out—of—control international trade in spyware, which has to stop.

Mr President, it is unfortunate that already, at the beginning of the new year, we are debating grave violations of human rights happening worldwide here, and Kazakhstan is in the spotlight. The citizens of Kazakhstan have spoken clearly before. They want to have a more democratic country, where inequalities in the rich fuel-producing country would fade away, and freedom of speech, the right to peaceful protest and freedom to choose political representation would be upheld. Instead, people are given a cult of oligarchic personality, none of the promises fulfilled, and inequalities widened. The actual conditions of long-term tension led to the protest. It is disgraceful that instead of leading debate with protesters and fulfilling some of the promised reforms, people were labelled as terrorists, violently beaten and killed. The EU, as a proclaimed leader in human rights, must reflect on what has been happening. Sadly, the EU has no voice in the region and has reacted with too little, too late. Furthermore, how can the sanction mechanism work when people like Orbán cannot recognise human rights violations and can block, thanks to the unanimity rule, the vote at the Council? For change to occur, we must establish ourselves as the influential partner who can help with peaceful resolutions, and to have credibility, we must impose targeted sanctions on the high-level Kazakh officials responsible or change our voting mechanism, which simply does not work.

Mr President, coercion, violence and force are methods we reserve for the most severe situations. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has chosen to deploy these methods against millions of its own citizens daily. Hong Kong is a stark reminder of how much prosperity, freedom and human dignity the Chinese regime is able to destroy. If we want to protect our friends in Hong Kong, or the brave Member State of Lithuania that finds itself under attack by the CCP, we Europeans must, more coherently and loudly, react to Chinese aggression. A symbolic start would be the boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics by all politicians. This symbol must be followed by a strong and enforceable law – the anti-coercion instrument. I hope that this is exactly what we, the European Parliament, will achieve in the upcoming months. Debates leading to action: that is our way, right?

Madam President, unfortunately we are sitting here again while sensing another war in Europe. The Russian unprecedented military activities and build-up in the proximity of the Ukrainian borders are clear evidence that Russia is willing to escalate the crisis. The US promised unprecedented sanctions in case of Moscow’s escalation. What will the EU promise – a direct neighbour and partner of Ukraine? They got away with it in Georgia. They got away with it in Crimea. Has the time when we leave the ambiguity and be clear that we won’t stand idly by finally come? Will we impose strong, targeted sanctions, notably in the bank, gas and oil sectors, and make sure that the price for a war is not one that Russia wants to pay? It is up to you, Mr Borrell, it is up to you, Council. Set the price really high, otherwise the one who will have to pay will be Ukraine, closely followed by us.

Mr President, listening to this whole debate, I decided to dedicate the first half of my speech to silence for the victims of dictators who are manipulating human lives. (Silence) Now to business. I urge the Member States to extend the sanctions against Lukashenko’s regime, as well as other enablers of this unacceptable human trafficking, and to start discussing activation of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, Poland needs the help and cooperation of Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office to stop illegal pushbacks at the EU borders. Proper registration of asylum claims needs to start now, before the winter strips these people of their last hopes and lives, and it needs to happen yesterday.

Mr President, Taiwan is a successful democracy. That is why they deserve our attention, our economic and political support and, above all, our commitments. For too long, we have been relying on Taiwan to protect the so-called silicon shield from China's expansion. But the CCP's actions, whether they are hybrid attacks or airspace violations, are clear. This shield won't last forever. Our partnership does not have to be based on chips alone, we have a lot to offer each other and build a new shield together – a shield made of human bonds that no one can break. We need to build a new shield from dialogues and, above all, meetings. We must not allow ourselves to be deterred by them, as they tried to do in my native land. It is our duty to offer Taiwan closer trade and cultural cooperation right now. Totalitarian regimes and authoritarians must remember that an attack on one democracy is an attack on all democracies.

Madam President, Commissioner, exceptionally today I will address the plenary and you in Czech. The upcoming laws on digital services and the digital market are a glimpse of hope that steps will be taken on disinformation, but this cannot replace the comprehensive approach we need. We would also not start the debate on traffic restrictions with whether to drive 130 km/h or 180 km/h on motorways if we completely lacked a definition of what a motorway is and how it differs from the pavement. We can say that we do see it, but we would have no tool to punish those who drive on the sidewalk. My questions to the Commission, Mr Breton, are quite specific, but I needed this shortcoming to be addressed in our debate. Here's what the internet did yesterday: Facebook and its affiliated services, such as WhatsApp and Instagram, are down. It didn't have to be a cyberattack either, but an internal problem that showed many how much our society depends on the oligopolies of big companies. The absence of competition between these tech giants results in dependency on a limited number of providers, and such dependencies, even outside the online world, lead to one thing: making it easier to compromise the user, for example by misusing the user's information space. How do we prevent this from happening on other strategic networks, such as gas? Decentralization and diversification. The same is needed for information networks. Simple and user-friendly interoperability between different platforms and applications protects users not only from outages or attacks on the platforms themselves, but also from becoming easy targets for information attackers. To what extent is the Commission focused on making such interoperability a reality? Yesterday, people didn't just move to Twitter. Many of the conversations that have gone mute on dropped platforms have shifted to American Signal, for example. Signal is open source and uses high-level end-to-end encryption. Users have moved there because this model inspires confidence in its security and code. How can we support European companies that want to replicate this approach? Where is the European Signal? And how can we generally help open source companies compete with global giants?

Madam President, information warfare intensity seems to be growing as fast as global computing capacity. Zero-click-spyware and ransomware attacks are exposing how vulnerable our infrastructure, our businesses and our private lives are in the digital realm. In our report we define European rules of engagement in the digital domain that are anchored in international law and we name state actors that show systemic aggressive behaviour, namely China, Russia and North Korea. We also recognise the advent of emerging technologies that actively change the global balance of power and call on the European Member States to lead on these technological developments and to adopt a common position on autonomous weapons systems that ensures meaningful human control. Equally, the European Parliament calls on the Member States to create a human-centric approach to AI regulation, based on democratic values. Finally, the protection of our military secrets and our individual privacy can only happen with strong encryption, and it is very important for my Group that we do not see any legal grey areas there. I would like to thank the rapporteur and the other colleagues for including many of our proposals and for fruitful cooperation on this report, and I support the final text.

Madam President, the NSO Group sold spyware to every dictator with money and created a global security risk for every democracy and every free person. We put a law in force just last week to stop European companies from doing just that. This law, the Dual-Use Regulation, will stop companies like NSO from exporting its spyware, thinly disguised via Cyprus or Bulgaria, but it is not enough. Spyware proliferation is a global crisis that does not respect national borders. Our next step, therefore, must be to ensure that producer countries such as the US join forces with us in the upcoming Trade and Technology Council. Equally, we must create a dedicated European Export Control Agency that has the resources, manpower and information access to stop the next NSO before it exposes our security and threatens our civil society.

Mr President, ever since Mr Borrell’s unfortunate visit to Moscow, a clear, strong stance on EU’s relations with Russia and Mr Putin has been awaited. In today’s ever-changing security environment, the EU either needs to talk with a unified voice or to cross out the word ‘common’ from its foreign and security policy. Russia has increased its interference via disinformation campaigns that seek to undermine our society. Crimea and Georgia are still stripped of their territorial integrity. We see an abuse of surveillance tech, and we stay silent while Putin silences opposition, as in the case of Aleksei Navalny. Such acts go against EU values. If we want to uphold our values – let alone our security – it is essential to set out clear conditions for any future engagement with Moscow in trade, in sanctions, in human rights. I hope we can agree on this report today, as our credibility lies in our unity.

Madam President, I would like to welcome Mr Borrell and thank him for joining us. The EEAS has proven to be a very valuable asset when addressing disinformation, Mr Borrell, however, I need to raise several issues. First and most important, in my view, is the brain-drain which has been going on in the StratCom Task Force over the past year. If we do not have motivated, adequately valued experts, dedicated to the topic and cause, we can pour more money into it, double the amount of reports and screenings, but – we won’t have results. We won’t have a deterrent. How are you addressing this, or are you planning to address it? Secondly, we talk today about resources a lot. You told us in March in the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE Committee), that you have very few resources to fight disinformation coming from China. However, the EEAS is not asking for more resources for its StratCom division. So which is it? Do you want more resources but won’t support steps to get them? Or do you want to avoid the issue of Chinese interference? Last but not least, developing effective countermeasures to raise the cost for perpetrators is a key part of fighting foreign interference. Which steps will the EEAS take in this regard to demonstrate to adversaries that we are willing to react credibly to their interference? What is the status of the developments of instruments for this purpose as foreseen in the European Democracy Action Plan?