9
Feb
2026
Ver
Banco Central Europeo: Informe Anual 2025 (debate)
Madam President, President Lagarde, Commissioner, dear colleagues, bringing inflation back to target after the pandemic has been a challenge. But it's been no worse than in any other major economy. So in this regard, let me reiterate what I said on a similar occasion one year ago: well done. But deep down, things are getting much tougher. The challenge to central bank independence is not a US oddity. It is a concerted attack from many fronts at a time of very high public debt. To fend off this attack, invoking the treaty provisions of denouncing attacks elsewhere is necessary, but not sufficient. People's trust in the ECB is anchored in its compromising primary objective: price stability for the good of EU citizens. A clear and narrow mandate strengthens accountability, anchors expectations, and ultimately makes independence easier to defend in a democratic society. When a central bank expands into areas that are perceived as going beyond this core mission, even with very good intentions, it exposes itself to growing political pressure. Safeguarding central bank independence today demands from us politicians to respect institutional lines, and for central banks to avoid mission creep. Monetary policy should never be subordinated to fiscal considerations or to other objectives that belong to the realm of elected policymakers, like climate actions or strategic autonomy. President Lagarde, it is not easy to self-restrict ECB capability when so many legitimate but conflicting objectives are requested from you. But in so doing you will be cementing ECB's independence which is Europe's most valuable asset.