Speeches

Mr President, dear Commissioner, 2024 is the high mass for Chinese and Russian disinformation. In 2024, more than 50% of the world population will vote. Free people will use what China and Russia fear most: democracy. There’s no surprise that we see active measures online, in the real world, and I would like to thank the Czech intelligence agency for actually disclosing that, for their openness on the website Voices of Europe. The best disinfectant is still sunlight. That website is down. So I commend you, dear Commissioner, for that. Great. But I would also like to inform you, dear colleagues, that many videos of that website are still online on social media platforms widely available, like on X owned by the indifferent Mr Musk. So if it’s the EU saying that we are serious about countering foreign malign interference, then set the example now. Make platforms remove the Russian Voices of Europe videos online. Do it now, because the elections are not in June, but they are now.

Mr President, dear Commissioner, colleagues, thanks to the pressure that’s been put in this House, these European Union buildings like this one are fully equipped with Western hard- and software. But our colleagues in the African Union were less fortunate. Their building is fully equipped with Chinese equipment and, demonstrably, that is being spied and being used against them in their own buildings. Now, last week, malicious software was discovered in our ports and harbours, here in our vital infrastructure. There’s plenty of concerns – all European intelligence agencies have these concerns about Chinese hard- and software, for example, being leveraged in their offensive espionage program – leveraged against us. So we need legislation, and this week we vote on the cybersecurity legislation of hard- and software products in a very good law. Also, because of your support, but also because we, in Parliament, introduced measures that enable the European Commission to impose market limitation, market restrictions to risky vendors and products because our citizens demand security, which means concrete decoupling. So the basis for decoupling and de-risking – sorry, not decoupling, but de-risking – is now here and now we need the full force of the European Commission to execute and keep us safe.

Mr President, Commissioner, I checked: it’s my 12th speech in this Parliament on the security of subsea infrastructure. So you might conclude I’m obsessed with it. But I guarantee you there’s someone even more obsessed with it and his name is Vladimir Putin. NATO and individual countries – like Tom Berendsen just said – are already operationally active to start countering Putin’s sabotage capabilities. And last week, the European Commission put forward a good plan – finally, I must say – to help protect our subsea infrastructure. Thank you! But I ask you to focus only on the things that the EU does best, and leave the rest to NATO or individual Member States. First, make sure that Russian and Chinese companies are excluded from commercial projects connecting Europe with internet cables. I ask for binding rules so that they can be enforced by the European Commission. Secondly, actively increase the connectivity of our continent with the rest of the world so sabotage will be less effective and consumer prices will be lower. Thirdly, create joint European subsea capabilities. Start by setting a standard for a European repair ship, for example, and build it. Set a standard for coast guard vessels; jointly build them; set the standards and do it. Buy them; set up a joint programme around it for joint information sharing, joint response, joint mitigation. Plant a flag by building concrete capabilities. I’ve seen plenty of strategy. Now let’s see the execution because with the current threat, execution is the strategy.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I stand before you today as a trans-Atlanticus, so as someone who appreciates that our military security is only guaranteed by the superior military strategic capability of the Americans. This is the main reason why Putin is not attacking European NATO member states for the time being. But we in Europe have alienated those American friends from ourselves. With almost all weapons systems that are absolutely necessary to be able to act at scale, but that are also too expensive to develop or to buy ourselves, we leave it to the Americans, and therefore we cannot defend ourselves now. So, from now on we will develop these systems ourselves in Europe or buy them ourselves, in Europe or in the US. The $100 billion defense fund is the absolute necessity. But a fully-fledged European pillar within NATO also needs a European Security Council with countries that are not in the EU, but are in NATO: Norway, United Kingdom, Turkey. Do not wait to set up such a structure, but start today.

Mr President, Commissioner, it is always very careful when the government calls for a fair price to be paid for something. The remedy is often worse than the ailment. Take a look, for example, at how Minister Hugo de Jonge has shut down the housing market in the Netherlands. Sure, he forced lower rents, but investors are now building fewer homes and the market is closing. Something similar is now happening in Europe in the field of patents. You'll be a patent holder. You will have recorded all your knowledge and intellectual property in those patents and make money with them, for example to build 5G and 6G networks in Europe. They reap the benefits of their work, they are companies such as Nokia, Ericsson but also Philips. I say: Nokia, Ericsson, Philips will not let what happened to Dutch investors in the housing market happen. Proposals that create bureaucratic layers, that affect business models of companies and of our European champions, that may play into the hands of Chinese business models. Colleagues, as we have said in Holland for centuries: Watch your case. Support tomorrow our amendments to rationalise this proposal and support our opposition to this bill.

Mr President, dear Minister, dear Commissioner, I think today we have to speak about mitigating the risk about deepfakes. And of course – of course – we have to criminalise the sharing of deepfake videos of Taylor Swift. We have to oblige creators of deepfake videos to put a label there. But the only way to tackle real – real – threats to our democracy and security is to put obligations on platforms, just like we ask platforms to tackle illegal content, IP infringements, spam, botnets, terrorist content and much more. And rightly so. But no obligations were set for platforms when it comes to deepfakes. Two years ago, we had a great opportunity to oblige Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, et cetera to detect and to watermark and label deepfake videos on the platform, so citizens at least know when a deepfake goes viral that it’s not real. My amendments on this made it to Parliament’s negotiating position, and thank you for that, rapporteur Christel Schaldemose, but it didn’t make it to the final position of the law. The big tech lobby won. And I’m very disappointed about that. Two years ago, one might say, ‘Deepfakes – is that a real life problem?’ But in 2024, we see daily deepfake scams and it’s rising fast and we need best-effort obligations for platforms to detect deepfakes and to label it as an obligation for them. Put it in the code of practice, or legislate before real and existential accidents occur to our democracy and security.

Madam President, Commissioner, representative of the Council, we’ve just learned the far left doesn’t want to dedicate any money to defence, but Russia, dear colleagues from the left, is dedicating 40% of its GDP to a malicious war in Europe. Let’s not fool ourselves that Putin will stop in Europe – Putin is preparing for a full-scale war with NATO. China, meanwhile, has spent each year a percentage more than its own GDP growth on its military. In other words, it is preparing for a war in Asia. If we want peace, a long-term plan to boost our own defence is the best deterrence against war. It was exactly that which ended the Cold War, by the way, against far left Communists. This European Commissioner has already done great work with two instruments enabling a European defence industrial base for our friends in Ukraine. But we are desperately waiting for a long-term instrument to complement that in order to keep peace. Last but not least, the new European Commission should have one Commissioner, including a Vice-President, dedicated to defence and the defence industry to show our commitment to building a European pillar in NATO.

Mr President, dear Commissioners, China is preparing for a war in Asia, and as soon as President XI is optimistic enough that he will succeed with little costs, the Middle Empire will strike. And in such a scenario, Europe will look at how to use its economic power, its leverage, similar to how we pressured Russia after it started its war here in Europe. But I doubt, dear colleagues, I very much doubt whether we are prepared for such a scenario. The fact is that China already both decoupled and de-risked from us, whereas we still let dependencies increase. So we need ASAP proposals for outbound investment screening to stop strategic industrial exposure in high-risk autocratic countries. We need European export controls on sensitive and strategic technologies, and far stronger investment in screening is necessary as we still see Chinese takeovers of European strategic industries. If you, Commissioner, come forward with such proposals, we will do anything we can to help you Europeanise such approaches and help create the instruments we need for the next generation of conflict.

Madam President, dear Commissioners, colleagues, I have the tradition of reviewing voting results after this House votes on things the Chinese Communist Party really dislikes, and the Greek Social Democrats tend to consistently abstain or vote against China-critical texts. The underpinning problem is, of course, Greece’s critical port of Piraeus now being China-owned. This is foreign interference at work. In my country, the Netherlands, we consistently supported Nord Stream 2, the pipeline, together with Germany, where it was obviously meant to punch off Ukraine, silence critical voices against Russia’s own malign behaviour. So capturing European elites, like Russia did with Gerhard Schröder, is here, of course, the underpinning problem. Real defence of democracy is therefore to get rid of pressure points of autocratic governments in our society, reduce our own exposure to theirs. Real defence of democracy is therefore outbound investment screening, blocking unwanted takeovers of critical industries, and to name and shame those captured elites. This Defence of Democracy package, dear Commissioners, is much welcomed and I support it. But the real defence of democracy is yet to come.

Madam President, at the basis of many technologies reducing carbon emissions, we find semiconductors, chips. Better, faster chips, better system designs – these are often the main drivers of reducing CO2 emissions. But true industrial policy, dear colleagues, is therefore bringing together industries and technologies downstream, and the Net-Zero Industry Act has the unique opportunity to bring the chip sector closer to the clean tech industry. Yet – yet – we see no mention of chips, no mention of semiconductors in the Net-Zero Industry Act. In fact, instead of synergies, chips are excluded from the scope, and this unnecessarily obstructs the joint research, it obstructs joint ventures, joint academic cooperation and talent development. I fully support what has been done on the net-zero industry by the rapporteur. Great work by the Commission, great work. But when it comes to reaching zero obstacles and net-zero obstacles between chips and between net-zero technologies, much can be done.

I was glad that you raised the issue of espionage and also cyber security in China and Beijing. Well, last week an EU institution, ETSI, which sets technological standards here in Europe, here in France, said very quietly, very silently, it was hacked. It didn’t say anything about criminal intent, ransomware intent. It was very quiet on that. Together with the cyber security agency of France, ANSEE, it made public that it was hacked. Of all states, of all adversarial states, only China has a clear strategy to influence sector tech standards, to influence it, and to become less free and to introduce censorship in our technology. What I would like to hear from you and my question to you, therefore, is do you have any technical artefacts from that hack, that point towards China? Is there any indication that China was involved in this cyber operation? Because if it was, it is unfair, like you said. It is unfair trade and competition. It is espionage, and it is another example on how the European Union and Commission should act towards China to reverse the low cost, low risk, high reward for China and actually do something about it.

Mr President, High Representative, colleagues, this week marks one year since the brave Mahsa Amini was shamefully beaten to death by the Islamic Morality Police in Tehran. We honour Amini, her relatives and friends today and we honour the brave Iranian people because they stood up against their oppressors. In this same week, we also express our continuous disapproval of the Iranian regime, not just for still further suppressing and oppressing the Iranian people or irresponsibly developing weapons of mass destruction, but also because of kidnapping European citizens to put political pressure on us here in Europe. This is unacceptable hostage diplomacy and the European answer for 513 days has been civilised silent diplomacy. Dear High Representative, there is a point in time where silent diplomacy is neither effective nor acceptable. That time is now. Three obvious suggestions. One: as long as Europeans in Iran can be taken hostage without any reason, we must not allow Europeans to travel to Iran. Two: expel Iranian ambassadors from Europe as long as our citizens do not return home safely. Three: finally put the IRGC on the EU terror list but complement that with another obvious course of action, sanctioning the men of Beit-e Rahbari, the Office of the Supreme Leader. They issue human rights violations on a daily basis. This week is to commemorate and to honour those in search of freedom and a better future. This is definitely not a week to stay silent.

Madam President, dear Commissioner, before I came to this Parliament, by profession I investigated Chinese hackers and the Chinese appetite to steal from our European semi-conductor industry was just appalling. It amounted to nothing less than pure theft of our industrial earning power and competitiveness. But with today’s vote on the European Chips Act, we contribute to reverse this trend. After today, Europe is again taking control of its earning power and its digital future. But already today, foundries, factories, researchers and innovation are coming back to Europe as we speak. Nearly EUR 100 billion of investments in 68 projects across Europe are already in the pipeline today. At the courtesy of this Parliament, the Chips Act also stands the geopolitical test of our time, more cooperation with our like-minded partners, stronger protection of intellectual property and European scrutiny on exports, too, and investments in China. With this blueprint for industrial policy, Europe reasserts its status as an industrial powerhouse. The best is therefore not just behind us, it is yet to come.

Mr President, dear Commissioner, it makes perfect sense that some EU Member States use commercial spyware to fulfil legitimate law enforcement requirements. That’s not the problem. The real problem, of course, is, like the rapporteur said, that some EU Member States use this spyware to discredit the democratic opposition and kill democracy in Europe. Poland, Hungary, Greece – shame on them. And I have a triple call to action to the Commission. First, since it is often the Israeli Government signing export licences for the spyware used to kill democracy in Europe, the EU should exert significant pressure on Jerusalem to halt such exports. Secondly, together with our American friends, the EU should put forward primary and secondary sanctions to entities who sell to the rule of law violators. Put these companies out of business. And, last but not least, let me remind the Commissioner that it was the brilliant Canadian NGO Citizens Lab who disclosed the Pegasus spyware scandal here in Europe in the first place. Where, dear Commissioner, is the European equivalent to investigate such technical operations? My amendment to the European budget has already created a budget line to create such an institution. It’s now up to you to follow up and make it happen.

Madam President, Commissioner, colleagues, in the same week that this House rings the alarm bells on malign foreign interference, disinformation, growing hatred and the declining trust in our democracies, often enabled by social media, in that same week, the CEO of Twitter decides to abandon the EU’s code of practice directed to counter disinformation and malign interference. And earlier, the CEO of Twitter had already fired the majority of his staff dealing with such problems. Mr Elon Musk seems to think that he’s in the American Wild West. Well he’s not. He’s operating in Europe, too, and there’s a new sheriff in town here in Europe. From this August onwards, the Digital Services Act enables the European Commission to fine up to 6% of the yearly revenue of Twitter. Dear Commissioner, I urge you to set an example and show how Europe deals with companies undermining our democracy, undermining our security. Because the report we vote on today shows how Russia, how China, how they vehemently continue to do so if we don’t regulate or act.

Mr President, dear Commissioner, concrete and credible plans for producing 1 million shells for Ukraine within 12 months is just spot on and much appreciated. And I would like to thank the competent commitment of this Commission and especially Commissioner Breton, but also Commissioner Borrell in particular, dedicated to the faith of defence in Europe. But with 5 000 shells, dear Commissioner, fired per day, Ukraine still needs 1.8 million shells instead of 1 million, or maybe triple that, since the numbers are separate of what NATO countries themselves already ordered extra. So I must convey my concern that this initiative might not be enough. Secondly, dear Commissioner, artillery is very, very important – but so are more interceptors for dedicated integrated air defence systems or MANPADS, or more multiple launch rocket system munitions, or more anti-tank missiles, more production lines for tanks or infantry fighting vehicles and combat support, et cetera, et cetera. Outperforming the Russian war economy is probably the best way to peace. In other words, this new munition act is a great breakthrough and a great complement for the European Union if we pull this off. But hopefully only the mere beginning and not the final solution in helping Ukraine win this war.

Madam President, dear Commissioner, colleagues, many voters in modern democracies base their choice on who to cast their vote for on what they read online on social media. I can hardly think of a bigger threat to our democracies than this because if Twitter, for example, is that town square Mr Musk is talking about, then should it be allowed for just one or two political parties to give speeches on that town square and not for others? Should it be allowed for just one or two political parties on the town square to paste posters? Hell no! Yet this is exactly what is happening online when social media algorithms draw voters into that rabbit hole and isolate them from pluralistic offerings of political views. On that town square, it may also never ever be allowed for authoritarian states such as Russia or China to finance, and therefore dictate, which political advertisements the people in that town of Mr Musk would get to see. The legislation we have before us today fills me with pride because it is tackling exactly such problems for the entire EU. We take matters into our own hands and we keep our democracy safe. My thanks to the rapporteur, Mr Gozi.

Mr President, as much as anyone might criticise the EU’s Global Gateway, the strategy and the concept are just brilliant. I mean, sustainable, trusted connections that bring free trade prosperity to all, and delivering all of that to the benefit of the EU’s geopolitical goals. Well done! Sure, there has been heavy, heavy criticism from the European Court of Auditors, which has to be taken extremely seriously, and Parliament will continue to do so and scrutinise the plans from the Commission. But all of that, all of the criticism, all of the cynicism, also today, will immediately dissolve, Commissioner, when the EU delivers, when the EU will become world champion in execution. It’s not about more strategy, it’s not about new wine in new wine skins. It’s about execution. Execution is the strategy. Show procreative power, show executive power and deliver projects, and show us in practice how rare earth materials strategy is hand—in—hand executed with the Development Goals.

Madam President, dear Commissioner, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has conducted many illegal hostages and killings, of course, in Iran, but increasingly on European soil. Members of the IRGC nonetheless send their children to study here in Europe. Social media platforms in Europe are being flooded with outrageous IRGC propaganda. And the IRGC holds financial assets here across this continent. And this will luckily all end soon. This House wants the IRGC to be labelled a terrorist organisation. This House will vote to impose costs on the IRGC and by doing so we demonstrate our support to the brave Iranian people. But let this also be a signal to so many Chinese companies like Huawei, on the brink of helping Iran develop an even more brutal surveillance state, to even further suppress the Iranian people, and to Russia, buying IRGC drones, selling them Su-35 fighter jets – this cannot be without consequences. The dangerous ideology of the IRGC has no place here in Europe, and ‘Zan, Zendegi, Azadi’ starts with putting and listing the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.

Mr President, whatever significant progress we make as humanity, our human nature will not change. So for those who say the problem with foreign interference is the poor, bad, moral or ethical judgment of some individuals, I advise them to re—read the Book of Genesis. It was mankind eating the apple, and mankind will continue to be tempted. The real problem is, of course, that a permissive security environment exists in Brussels and in Strasbourg, where our adversaries operate in the heart of our democracy in order to interfere with it. Until recently, we had a China friendship group with a secretary—general from China who acted, paid by this House, and was authorised to work here. Similar groups exist for Qatar and other states. Russian interns walked the floors of this House. We still allow MEPs to travel to third countries, irrespective of who pays the bills. Our IT systems are vulnerable for espionage, and therefore external pressure on Members. Our security organisation is under—equipped, Commissioner, and hardly staffed to the level we need. Yes, justice must have its way with individuals and corrupt individuals must be punished, but this House urgently needs to create a non—permissive counter intelligence environment so that our adversaries don’t even dare to interfere with us.

Madam President, dear Commissioner, High Representative, some see intellectual property theft on an almost industrial scale as the second-oldest profession in the world. What’s new? Instead of the slow drainage of our economic competitiveness, some see unfair competition with state subsidies, non-reciprocal market access just as mere trade issues, technical, instead of a frontal attack on our prosperity. And some see Chinese disinformation or support for dictators worldwide or its relationship with Russia, its military build-up as merely an expression of the new multipolar world, ‘get used to it’, instead of an attack on the liberal world order. Well, the EU, we respond to such threats with numerous pieces of legislation, critical entities, cybersecurity, foreign direct investment and what have you. But we do so with a country-agnostic, a country-neutral approach. But, in practice, this significantly hampers the effectiveness of these measures. Country-specific problems need country-specific legislation. We might believe we live in peace with the world, but China dictates itself that is in conflict with us. So act accordingly and let’s legislate accordingly.

President, dear Commissioner, yet another piece of well-crafted, much needed and warmly welcomed legislation protecting Europe’s critical infrastructure is key in making Europe safe and prosperous. Thank you, dear rapporteur. It’s just like the NIS 2, like you mentioned, dear Commissioner, and the foreign direct investment screening, the Democracy Action Plan, but also the Economic Coercion Instrument. But what do these files have in common? Against whom are we protecting ourselves? Let’s be clear: the reality is we are protecting ourselves against a small number of three countries who have something in common, namely an offensive intellectual property theft programme directed against us. The second thing is they want to thwart the liberal world order. And thirdly, last but not least, they are willing and able to do so in our own backyard, here, extraterritorially. That’s the problem. It’s Russia, Iran and China; let’s name these three. We might believe we live in peace with the world, but yet they declared a conflict against us. And yet we formulate generic responses. But, dear Commissioner, country-specific problems require country-specific legislation against these three nations. That’s what we’d like to see in future.

Madam President, dear Commissioner, my commitment in the first term to buy drinks for all shadow rapporteurs and the excellent staff has been reinforced by this debate. So you owe me one! I have two comments to make for the Green Party and especially the Pirate Party. They fear that the free and open internet is at stake. Well, let me just mention two things here. First, on my personal – my personal – journey to regulate root—level DNS servers, my personal journey was to get that out of scope, and we’ve managed: no regulation, no government controls of the root—level DNS. So be happy with that. The second thing is that the internet will be free, but if hackers hire anonymous infrastructure, then we want to know with what bitcoin address did you do it, what session cookie was placed, what IP address was used, what domain was used. We want to know those technical terms so we can track you and defend ourselves. The only thing I’d like to mention again to them is that it’s not just public information: it’s only there for legitimate access—seekers, and it means that cybersecurity experts and law enforcement get this information, but also journalists, and journalists are important. Why? This democratises the debate. Journalists can verify cyberattacks, verify what has happened. And democratising the debate on cybersecurity is one of the goals that we have also here in this Parliament. Last but not least, this is the best legislation we’ve yet seen in this continent. We go from a passive stance to an active stance. We’re shaping our digital environment in our atmosphere and therefore our digital future. I will leave you with one thought, which is food for thought. With the attack on Colonial Pipeline in the US, the malware, the malicious software, would not have gone live if the computers would have had Russian language settings or Russian time settings. Just remember that this is not just a technical problem, this is also a geopolitical problem, a problem for diplomacy, a problem for counter—intelligence. So the NIS is a good step forward. We’re not there yet. Russia will not stop with this legislation. We need to do more. That’s why I encourage the Commission with the new plans they came with today, we will work on it together. Thank you, and let’s vote.

Mr President, dear Commissioner, dear colleagues, it is with pride I stand before you here today in Brussels, the result of two years, almost two years, of fierce debates, hundreds of consultations with so many stakeholders from around the world. It resulted in the best cybersecurity legislation this continent has yet seen. And today, we are not just voting on that legislation that significantly enhances Europe’s cybersecurity – it makes it a safer place to work, do business and live. We are also introducing a new mindset in Europe, a new phase in our common European digital future. From pioneering to professionalisation, from cybersecurity as a niche subject to making it Chefsache – a good German word. The CEOs matter, and that goes for Commissioners and also for ministers. And most important, from reactive information-sharing after an incident, which is still important, to proactive prevention and actively stopping new accidents from occurring. Europe has suffered enormous costs of being attacked on an almost industrial scale, yet still we invest 41% less than our American businesses and the sharing of information in the cybersecurity community from which I stem, has been hampered. This legislation is reversing that. But meanwhile, because of the encouragement of the Kremlin, Russian hackers, criminal ransomware groups are trying to weaken economic wellbeing and economic structures. With the support of Beijing, many dozens of hacker groups try to steal our intellectual property and trade secrets to weaken our economies and strengthen theirs. Many of this is not directly seen with the eye or is in the media that often. It often happens that companies do not wish to go public, but it happens every day and that’s why we ask critical infrastructure to invest. That’s why we make a sound legal basis for information-sharing between governments, businesses, experts and countries outside the EU. And for those who think this is expensive, remember that the American credit rating agency Moody’s recently valued the NIS2 and said it’s credit-positive for doing business in Europe. Although this is the best cybersecurity legislation this continent has yet seen, let us not congratulate ourselves too much. Here’s what still needs to be done. First, if ransomware is an instrument of, let’s say, foreign policy of the Kremlin, then technical controls like this legislation will not stop Russia. We have to indict the hackers, track them, make sure when they travel, they get incarcerated behind bars. We need diplomatic and counterintelligence offensives as well. Secondly, yes, the NIS2 asks, demands that Member States put forward an active defence cyber posture. It means that, in practice, cybersecurity centres will have to cooperate with internet service providers to block malicious domains when people accidentally click on it, because it does happen. Thirdly, supply chain security. Yes, within the NIS2 there is a good possibility for reviewing risky software and hardware vendors. But we need new legislation to protect us. When countries with an offensive intellectual property theft programme directed against us and their companies enter our markets, we need legislation. Fourth, our sub-sea infrastructure. The NIS2 marks optic fibre cables below sea as vital infrastructure, but the plans to protect it are hardly sufficient yet. In the Defence and Subcommittee and Industry Committee, we will put forward new plans to do just that. Last but not least, colleagues, let me also take this opportunity to say that the last European cybersecurity vendor – endpoint security antivirus – that we have is European, and let’s keep it that way, Commissioner. I would like to thank all the shadow rapporteurs present here for their constructive political work on this file. The staff – I will buy you a drink afterwards! But let me just mention the most important people that have to be mentioned today in this plenary room: the cybersecurity community to whom this work is dedicated. I came to Brussels to make cybersecurity legislation, to create a safe place to work and to do business. That safer place is mainly the result of the hard work of those many cybersecurity professionals out there. And to all you computer nerds out there: we hear, we see you, we are keeping you enabled to do your business. You keep us safe, we see you and we support you. Now, let’s vote today on this important legislation and thanks for the good cooperation, everyone.

Mr President, dear Commissioner, dear colleagues, I’m a Member of the European Parliament coming from The Hague, the Netherlands. The Hague welcomes many people from around the world. But unlike any other city in the world, it actively welcomes war criminals by keeping them incarcerated behind bars. And I can tell you, there’s plenty of room in The Hague, I can assure you. In my experience, their countries extradite their war criminals to The Hague when they want to come clean with the past, when they envisage a new, brighter future. The Iranian people are currently in a similar process, imagining a brighter future for their country. So the importance of today’s debate here is not just about supporting the brave Iranian people, standing up to repression, to torture, and to the lack of freedom. It’s that, but it’s also about helping them imagine that bright future. Europe can do and should do exactly that by putting out new sanctions – sanctions to human rights offenders, to the IRGC – but also by actively hampering Iranian cyber operations. Let’s also make a plan for that, for new sanctions on dual—use goods. Let’s help the people in Iran by making the people in The Hague excited, by welcoming their new citizens behind bars.