What José Manuel spoke about.

–Mr President, Commissioner, I am going to talk about Gibraltar, but do not be alarmed, I am not going to talk about sovereignty, because if that does not concern the Spanish Government, I do not know why my friend Markus Ferber, who lives in Bavaria, is going to be concerned. I'm going to talk about tax havens and money laundering. The only agreement between the United Kingdom and Spain after the Brexit It's the tax deal. You will ask yourself: Did it change Gibraltar's quasi-Arab privileged regime? The answer is no. And it did not do so despite the fact that no capital gains are paid in Gibraltar, no taxes are paid on profits made outside the Rock, there are no indirect taxes, neither general nor special, and online gambling rates are so favorable that the Rock absorbed 40% of world trade. This has important consequences in the Community territory and in the surrounding Spanish territory. Today in Gibraltar there are 32,000 Gibraltarians, but 30,000 societies – one society per Gibraltarian, including babies. There are no manufacturing industries and tourism is limited. However, it has the third highest per capita income in the world, an income that – thanks to these privileges – is ten times higher than that of the closest Spanish people. Yesterday we talked about the grey list of countries that can promote money laundering and asked the Commission to exclude it. Now comes an agreement that is being negotiated in complete opacity and it will be up to this Parliament to correct these excesses that greatly harm the financial interests of the Union and call into question the total financial system of our countries.

Mr President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, the fact that we are discussing this agreement here is good news because the European Union in general and the Commission in particular have paid very little attention to Ibero-America in this legislature. That disdain for such a close continent is suicidal at a time when we are witnessing a struggle between liberal democracies and illiberal democracies. It is also a good agreement because Chile, along with Mexico, was a pioneering agreement with that region. That we are able to modernise it at the moment is going in the right direction, especially since, as has been stressed here, trade and investment have doubled since it entered into force in 2003. It is good news because it talks about issues that could not be in the first agreement: digital trade, investment protection, legal certainty in the face of populist temptations both on that continent and in part of our own, sustainable and balanced development, and an aid scheme. There are good reasons for this debate. Agricultural trade is liberalized. There is talk of trade in services at a time when globalization is changing direction, trade in services is increasing and trade in goods is decreasing. There is talk of public procurement and there is talk, I repeat, of investments. And on agriculture, a warning for this agreement, and for those who will come on implementation - having heard the kind words of the left group on this agreement - I think a balanced precision would be important. Climate change is a reality that we cannot ignore. But food security too, and those two objectives must be harmonized. At a time when European farmers – I am talking about Spaniards – are finding that prices are at levels of 20 years ago, among other things, due to pressure from food chains and the entry of products from third countries that do not meet the requirements we set. Balance in both, I insist. Importance of Ibero-America underlining the bilateral agreements, verified as it has been... (the Chair took the floor from the speaker).

Mr President, after the turbulent times we have experienced, we must return to normality. But normality does not mean simply returning to the world of yesterday, which Stefan Zweig would say, it means learning from the lessons of history and correcting what has not worked. The new fiscal framework maintains the limits set in Maastricht, and so it should be, but it sets out three novelties. The first is to establish individual fiscal paths for each country taking into account the situation of its finances. Second, pay more attention to growth. And the third, adhering to the medium term much more than the short term. But flexibility means neither discretion nor arbitrariness. Flexibility requires strong political commitment, heavy responsibility and the maintenance of sanctions, such as departing from the Structural Funds. My country, Spain, entered the pandemic in a complicated situation. There was a playwright who spoke of the holy fear of deficit. That was lost and our public debt and deficit have skyrocketed. Adjustments need to be made on the basis of expenditure and not on the basis of income so as not to harm growth.

Mr President, Commissioner, today's debate is about the launch of the digital euro as a complement to, and not a substitute for, cash. In this debate we are not alone: other central banks are doing the same, and we would do well to try to go hand in hand. This implementation, in short, must be preceded by a cost-benefit analysis. In case of doubt, we must refrain from acting, although we must not refrain from further studying this matter so as not to be left behind. I have three certainties. The first is that the digital euro must be available to all citizens and businesses in the eurozone. La segunda, que estará contabilizado en el balance del Banco Central Europeo, lo cual quiere decir que estamos hablando de un bien público y no de un bien privado. The third is that operations vis-à-vis the public will be delegated – I stress ‘delegated’ – to financial institutions, which does not exempt the European Central Bank and this institution from remaining vigilant in the regulation and supervision of what is done in this field. I make three warnings. The first is that the digital euro must be attractive for it to be accepted by the population, but it must not be overly accepted so that it does not become a store of value that ends cash and speeds up the withdrawal of deposits; in such a case, the euro would lose its status as a monetary anchor. The second is that the digital euro's access to non-residents and its interoperability with other digital currencies in other areas will make the payments transferred cheaper and more effective. And the third, that the digital euro should not compete with digital payment services currently provided by private institutions, but complement them. It is an important debate, the holding of which we cannot delay.

Madam President, Commissioner, Scripture tells us about foolish virgins and prudent virgins. In the crisis of 2008 the European Union behaved like foolish virgins and when the Lord arrived they had no oil in the candlestick. At the time, the European Central Bank took much longer than its American, Japanese or English counterparts to lower interest rates or buy assets on the markets. National governments were forced to come to the rescue of their financial institutions in complete solitude, until well into the crisis, because there was no solidarity reaction. The result was truly remarkable austericide programs and a torpedo on the waterline of the European project. Did we do anything right? We did something right. We made the Single Supervisory Mechanism and regulation of banks, insurance, markets, stocks and the European Systemic Risk Board. But we were left with themes in the inkwell: completing the capital market, European fund insurance and crisis management mechanisms. And a warning: I am well aware that the central bank’s main objective is to maintain price stability; but not forgetting the other objectives of the Treaty, not forgetting that it must act – it must – in such a way that it does not jeopardise growth, which is very weak and which can lead to recession. The policy of interest – the Central Bank is independent – must be pursued with these two objectives in mind.

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, Gibraltar: Don't worry, I'm not going to talk to you about sovereignty, because, if that doesn't matter to President Sanchez, I don't see why it's going to matter to you. I'm going to talk to you about money and dark money. Gibraltar has 6.7 square kilometers, 34 000 residents, no natural resource, 30 000 companies and the third income per capita highest in the world. Almost five times that of El Tesorillo, a neighboring town. Gibraltarians are ingenious, but there's probably something else. For example, taxation. Indirect taxes there are low. Corporate tax is not levied on profits made outside the Rock, i.e., all of them. Pedro Sánchez signed an agreement in 2019 that consolidates this privileged regime and, in addition, allows residents there free access to the European internal market. Who is going to invest in Algeciras instead of the Rock? We now know that there are doubts about its legislation on money laundering and terrorist financing. The agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom on Gibraltar is now being negotiated. Pay close attention to what you do, do not look at distant paradises and consecrate a Cayman Islands on our southern border.