Conclusioni e raccomandazioni della commissione speciale sullo scudo europeo per la democrazia

Presentato da Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński

Aggiunto: 132a. Stresses that the credibility of the EU’s efforts to counter foreign interference, corruption and malign influence depends first and foremost on its willingness to address vulnerabilities within its own institutions with the same determination and transparency that it expects from the Member States; recalls that foreign interference does not operate solely through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks or external influence operations, but may also exploit corruption, bribery, conflicts of interest, opaque lobbying, revolving-door practices, inadequate scrutiny of external contacts and weaknesses in the control of EU funding; recalls, in this regard, the serious institutional vulnerabilities exposed by the ‘Qatargate’ corruption scandal, which demonstrated the capacity of third-country interests to seek influence within Parliament through financial inducements, intermediaries and covert networks; further recalls the conviction of former MEPs for accepting bribes in return for activities promoting pro-Russian interests, including parliamentary interventions, which constitutes a particularly serious example of foreign financial influence reaching directly into parliamentary activity; considers that such cases must be treated not merely as individual instances of misconduct but as warnings concerning the resilience, integrity and security of the EU’s own democratic institutions; draws particular attention, in this context, to the money-laundering charges brought against former EU Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders, and to reports of his close contacts with Russian nationals, including a sanctioned oligarch close to Putin, at a time when the Commissioner was also responsible for the implementation of sanctions; calls on the Commission to cooperate with the relevant authorities and services and to take its own steps to clarify how the allegations against Commissioner Reynders may have affected the exercise of his duties, including whether they undermined the EU’s policy towards Russia and whether they contributed to unjustified attacks against Poland, a frontline Member State and a key country in supporting Ukraine; strongly condemns revolving-door practices whereby former senior political office-holders assume remunerated positions or advisory roles in state-controlled companies or structures linked to authoritarian third countries, as illustrated by the involvement of former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder with the Russian energy sector; stresses that such relationships may create dependencies, conflicts of interest and opportunities for foreign leverage and may severely damage public confidence in European decision-making;

Testo come pubblicato dal PE, in inglese. PE788.231