Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield

Wording as published by the EP, in English.

1. Amendment 1Rejected

   Recital AB a (new)

   Tabled by Csaba Dömötör, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri +2 · PfE

   Added: ABa. whereas the freedom of speech and expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society; whereas the European Court of Human Rights established in its judgment of 7 December 1976 in Handyside v the United Kingdom, and has consistently reaffirmed in its subsequent jurisprudence, that this freedom is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to information or ideas that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population;

2. Amendment 2Rejected

   Paragraph 1 a (new)

   Tabled by Csaba Dömötör, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri +2 · PfE

   Added: 1a. Recalls that the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality must be fully respected and that the European Democracy Shield must not result in an unjustified transfer of competences from the Member States to the EU or an expansion of Commission powers beyond those conferred by the Treaties; stresses the need to preserve the institutional balance established by the Treaties;

3. Amendment 3Rejected

   Paragraph 34 a (new)

   Tabled by Csaba Dömötör, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri +2 · PfE

   Added: 34a. Stresses that freedom of expression and information, including freedom of opinion, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be fully respected; underlines that measures against disinformation, including AI-enabled disinformation, must not become a pretext for censorship, political interference or ideological filtering; insists that the removal of content on grounds of illegality must be subject to an independent judicial decision or effective judicial review; rejects granting public authorities or publicly funded bodies the role of arbiters of truth;

4. Amendment 4Rejected

   Paragraph 48 a (new)

   Tabled by Csaba Dömötör, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri +2 · PfE

   Added: 48a. Calls for the dismantling of EU-supported fact-checking organisations and networks; warns that institutionalised fact-checking risks undermining freedom of expression, media pluralism and open democratic debate; calls for the EU to favour transparency, free media and the exchange of ideas over publicly endorsed fact-checking structures, and to scrutinise the funding of organisations involved in politically sensitive fact-checking activities;

5. Amendment 5Rejected

   Paragraph 53 a (new)

   Tabled by Csaba Dömötör, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri +2 · PfE

   Added: 53a. Calls on the Commission to establish a single, publicly accessible database covering all NGO grants, contracts, sub-grants and funded projects, including beneficiaries, amounts and relevant funding programmes; calls for the publication of underlying contracts upon request and the names and affiliations of external experts involved in funding decisions; stresses that, where NGOs receive EU funding, their financial relations and use of EU funds should be subject to full transparency, scrutiny and democratic accountability;

6. Amendment 6Rejected

   Paragraph 80 a (new)

   Tabled by Csaba Dömötör, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri +2 · PfE

   Added: 80a. Recognises the particular threat of interference posed by the Muslim Brotherhood, notably through the infiltration and manipulation of European civil society via third-party organisations; is concerned, in this regard, about the Commission’s funding of the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), despite its links to the Muslim Brotherhood (as demonstrated by the French Ministry of the Interior in 2025); is also concerned about the activities of other organisations such as the Council of European Muslims (CEM), the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations, (FEMYSO) and the Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en Europe (CCIE), which form a complex network propagating the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and threatening European societies;

7. Amendment 7Rejected

   Paragraph 101 a (new)

   Tabled by Csaba Dömötör, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri +2 · PfE

   Added: 101a. Emphasises that electoral law and the organisation of elections remain within the competences of the Member States; stresses that EU action must respect national constitutional frameworks and democratic choices; calls for appropriate representation of opposition parties, or their participation as observers, in structures dealing with democratic governance; asserts that the European Democracy Shield’s initiatives must not, in themselves, constitute a risk of interference;

8. Amendment 8Rejected

   Paragraph 104 a (new)

   Tabled by Csaba Dömötör, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri +2 · PfE

   Added: 104a. Calls on the Member States to prevent political parties, elected representatives and candidates from being denied essential banking services or financing solely on the basis of their political views or lawful activities; calls for transparent and objective criteria, effective remedies and appropriate safeguards against politically motivated account closures or financial discrimination, without prejudice to applicable anti-money laundering and financial regulatory requirements;

9. Amendment 9Rejected

   Paragraph 104 b (new)

   Tabled by Csaba Dömötör, Marieke Ehlers, Fabrice Leggeri +2 · PfE

   Added: 104b. Calls for EU-funded NGOs to refrain from political activities aimed at influencing electoral outcomes or the democratic choice of voters; stresses that NGOs must not be used as instruments of electoral interference or indirect political campaigning, and calls for effective transparency and safeguards to prevent EU funding from being used for such purposes;

10. Amendment 11Rejected

    Citation 70 a (new)

    Tabled by Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt · The Left

    Added: – having regard to the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament regarding integrity and transparency,

11. Amendment 15Rejected

    Paragraph 6 a (new)

    Tabled by Danilo Della Valle · The Left

    Added: 6a. Stresses that the proposed European Centre for Democratic Resilience should operate on the basis of a clearly defined mandate, transparent governance, appropriate democratic oversight and robust safeguards on fundamental rights; stresses that the Centre should primarily facilitate coordination, knowledge-sharing and independent analysis and should not acquire operational or monitoring functions that could affect the exercise of fundamental rights;

12. Amendment 16Rejected

    Paragraph 24 a (new)

    Tabled by Manon Aubry · The Left

    Added: 24a. Condemns any interference by Israeli authorities in democratic processes, including attempts to influence electoral campaigns and elections in Member States, such as those reported during the French local elections of March 2026; calls for the publication of all reports and findings concerning such interference, in order to ensure transparency, accountability and the protection of democratic sovereignty;

13. Amendment 17Rejected

    Paragraph 32 a (new)

    Tabled by Danilo Della Valle · The Left

    Added: 32a. Highlights the importance of safeguarding anonymous public participation by fully and properly implementing the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data that constitute an indispensable prerequisite for the exercise of other fundamental human rights; calls on the Member States to put in place appropriate and effective safeguards to protect the identity of anonymous public participants and confidential sources;

14. Amendment 19Rejected

    Paragraph 42 a (new)

    Tabled by Danilo Della Valle · The Left

    Added: 42a. Highlights that digital public goods fundamentally contribute to the integrity of the EU’s knowledge infrastructure while at the same time empowering citizens, including young people, minorities and marginalised groups, to participate meaningfully in democratic life; calls on the Commission to acknowledge this aspect and promote the use of digital public goods as building blocks for achieving a sovereign and resilient EU digital infrastructure;

15. Amendment 20Rejected

    Paragraph 44 a (new)

    Tabled by Danilo Della Valle · The Left

    Added: 44a. Stresses that the EU’s approach to digital surveillance and other technologies affecting fundamental rights should be consistent with and based on the same standards irrespective of the country of origin and irrespective of whether such technologies are developed, sold or used by third countries or by companies and authorities linked to strategic partners, including the United States and Israel; underlines that the protection of fundamental rights, in particular the rights to privacy and data protection, should be ensured without double standards; considers that such a consistent approach is essential to preserving the EU’s external credibility in promoting fundamental rights and democratic values, as well as the effectiveness of the European Democracy Shield;

16. Amendment 25Rejected

    Paragraph 110 a (new)

    Tabled by Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt · The Left

    Added: 110a. Reiterates that Members of the European Parliament must act in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament regarding integrity and transparency; recommends in this regard that an audit be performed on the general allowance of and all other forms of financial contributions to Members of the European Parliament on a yearly basis in order to increase Parliament’s transparency and trust in its Members among the citizens of the EU as well as reduce the risk of undue influence, interference or corruption;

17. Amendment 25Rejected

    Paragraph 110 a (new)

    Tabled by Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt · The Left

    Added: 110a. Reiterates that Members of the European Parliament must act in accordance with the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament regarding integrity and transparency; recommends in this regard that an audit be performed on the general allowance of and all other forms of financial contributions to Members of the European Parliament on a yearly basis in order to increase Parliament’s transparency and trust in its Members among the citizens of the EU as well as reduce the risk of undue influence, interference or corruption;

18. Amendment 27Rejected

    Paragraph 1

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    … mission of the European Democracy Shield should be to protect European democracy Removed: amid an ever-evolving threat landscape Added: from external threats and ultimately contribute to safeguarding the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; …

19. Amendment 28Rejected

    Paragraph 1 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 1a. Recalls that any binding or operational EU action under the European Democracy Shield requires a specific legal basis under the Treaties and must respect the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality; stresses that new technologies or evolving threats cannot in themselves create new EU competences;

20. Amendment 29Rejected

    Paragraph 2 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 2a. Stresses that controversial, polarising or coordinated political communication does not as such constitute FIMI; insists that content-related action under the European Democracy Shield be based on objective and verifiable evidence of foreign direction, funding or operational coordination and must not extend to lawful domestic political expression, advocacy or mobilisation;

21. Amendment 30Rejected

    Paragraph 3 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 3a. Stresses that democracy requires political contestation and the possibility of peaceful change of power; recalls that opposition, dissent and public criticism are normal features of democratic life and must be embraced rather than treated as threats merely because they challenge institutions or governing majorities; underlines that a democracy shield must protect citizens from hostile actors, not institutions from citizens;

22. Amendment 31Rejected

    Paragraph 12 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 12a. Stresses that the Centre’s primary function should be to facilitate voluntary structured cooperation, information-sharing and coordination among existing EU and national actors, building on their mandates and expertise rather than replicating existing functions; stresses that it must not determine the truthfulness, legitimacy or political acceptability of narratives, viewpoints or opinions;

23. Amendment 32Rejected

    Paragraph 19 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Sarah Knafo, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 19a. Opposes the establishment of a European Centre for Democratic Resilience, considering that such a structure would constitute a new permanent European agency encroaching upon Member States’ competences in the areas of internal security and public order, would add to an already crowded landscape of EU bodies, networks and platforms dealing with similar issues, and would entail operating costs to be borne by taxpayers; considers that the objectives invoked can be achieved through enhanced voluntary and intergovernmental cooperation between existing national structures, without the creation of a new EU entity with its own budget, staff and mandate;

24. Amendment 33Rejected

    Paragraph 20 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Stanisław Tyszka, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 20a. Reminds the Commission that the Treaties do not confer on it any powers to monitor or approve elections in Member States; recalls that the Commission should act solely within the powers conferred on it by the Member States, and with due regard for national electoral legislation;

25. Amendment 34Rejected

    Paragraph 22

    Tabled by Christine Anderson · ESN

    22. Removed: Condemns the targeted sanctions and attempts at coercion by the US administration against EU actors involved in shaping and enforcing Added: Considers that the EU cannot credibly denounce the US administration’s targeted sanctions against those responsible for the DSA and other digital Removed: regulations, in particular against a former commissioner; calls for the immediate lifting of these measures; urges the Commission and the Member States to resist such pressure, uphold EU legislation, and defend the right to self-governance and digital sovereignty; underlines that freedom of expression is a fundamental right in the EU and a core value shared with the United States and like-minded partners across the democratic world; stresses that political and trade considerations, as well as pressure from third countries or large technology companies, should not unduly influence the enforcement of EU digital legislation; stresses that decisions concerning the application of EU digital rules must be guided solely by EU law and the protection of democratic interests, and that the EU, as an open and rules-based single market, retains the sovereign right to regulate its economic activity in line with democratic values and international commitments; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the protective and redress mechanisms of EU digital legislation are shielded from any interference that could compromise their independence or effectiveness, and to establish robust safeguards against such risks; Added: legislation, including a former commissioner, while itself imposing restrictive measures on third-country officials because their domestic policies diverge from EU preferences; calls for a consistent rejection of sanctions used to punish lawful legislative or regulatory choices;

26. Amendment 35Rejected

    Paragraph 25 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 25a. Stresses that crisis protocols and rapid-response mechanisms must remain exceptional, time-limited and fully traceable; insists that such protocols and mechanisms have a clear legal basis, be subject to effective parliamentary oversight, ensure that all requests or referrals to platforms are recorded and provide affected persons with access to redress; rejects permanent monitoring or pre-emptive intervention in lawful democratic debate;

27. Amendment 36Rejected

    Paragraph 29 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson · ESN

    Added: 29a. Notes with concern that Russia has charged Telegram founder Pavel Durov with facilitating terrorist activity and placed him on an international wanted list; recalls the broader context of Russian pressure on Telegram over content removal and access to user data; condemns the misuse of criminal law to coerce platforms into political censorship or mass surveillance;

28. Amendment 37Rejected

    Paragraph 29 b (new)

    Tabled by Sarah Knafo, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 29b. Insists that the application of the DSA and the designation of a platform as a very large online platform must be based exclusively on objective and quantitative criteria, in particular the number of active users, and not on the nature of the political opinions expressed on that platform; reiterates that the fight against foreign interference must never serve as a pretext for censoring lawful political content, including content critical of the EU institutions;

29. Amendment 38Rejected

    Paragraph 34 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Stanisław Tyszka, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 34a. Warns against de facto internet censorship through overly far-reaching measures; stresses that the European Democracy Shield must not be used to suppress lawful political dissent or confer on public authorities the power to determine permissible political views; recalls that measures affecting the visibility, ranking or dissemination of lawful content may interfere with the right to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority, guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and must satisfy the requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality under Article 52 thereof;

30. Amendment 39Rejected

    Paragraph 48 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 48a. Notes that fact-checking organisations receiving EU funding may be called upon to assess claims concerning the institutions financing them; calls for full disclosure of their public and private funding, governance and methodologies, and for safeguards ensuring their political, financial and editorial independence;

31. Amendment 40Rejected

    Paragraph 48 b (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 48b. Rejects the institutionalisation of ‘prebunking’ or predictive narrative intervention; stresses that democratic resilience requires citizens to evaluate competing claims and that public authorities must not seek to neutralise lawful narratives before they circulate;

32. Amendment 41Rejected

    Paragraph 48 c (new)

    Tabled by Sarah Knafo, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 48c. Stresses that fact-checking must, under no circumstances, serve as an automatic basis for the removal, demotion or demonetisation of lawful content, and that any such decision must always fall within the remit of an independent judicial authority rather than private bodies financed by the institutions whose activities they are supposed to assess;

33. Amendment 42Rejected

    Paragraph 53 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 53a. Stresses that EU institutions are themselves participants in the information environment through public communication, funding and awareness campaigns; emphasises that such activities and the funding of media and civil society must remain transparent and politically neutral and not be conditional on supporting the Commission’s contested policy preferences;

34. Amendment 43Rejected

    Paragraph 56 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Stanisław Tyszka, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 56a. Calls for full transparency regarding EU, national and third-country funding of civil society organisations, think tanks and umbrella organisations involved in democratic-resilience activities, including amounts, intermediaries, beneficiaries and purposes; stresses that transparency rules must apply equally and proportionately;

35. Amendment 44Rejected

    Paragraph 56 b (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson · ESN

    Added: 56b. Notes with concern the structural and personnel links between the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) and Türkiye’s Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), including imams employed by the Turkish State; calls for full transparency regarding DITIB’s governance, financing, personnel and instructions from third-country authorities; calls for the completion of the agreed phase-out of Turkish state-employed imams; stresses that public funding and participation in consultative structures should be conditional on organisational independence from third-country governments, with full respect for freedom of religion;

36. Amendment 45Rejected

    Paragraph 61

    Tabled by Christine Anderson · ESN

    … of the knowledge acquired in Ukraine about the conduct of modern warfare; Added: condemns the attempted explosive-drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport, which the German Government has attributed to actors acting on behalf of Russian state agencies; calls for a coordinated response and stronger protection of critical aviation infrastructure;

37. Amendment 46Rejected

    Paragraph 78 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson · ESN

    Added: 78a. Condemns violence, intimidation and attacks against police officers and other law-enforcement personnel; stresses that attacks on their integrity and safety are attacks on democracy itself;

38. Amendment 47Rejected

    Paragraph 78 b (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson · ESN

    Added: 78b. Regrets that the Commission does not state whether it recognises Hamas’s strategic communication as FIMI or whether the EEAS specifically monitors Hamas as a FIMI actor1a; calls on the EEAS to systematically monitor, attribute and expose Hamas-led social-media information operations targeting audiences in the EU and to report regularly to Parliament; 1a Answer of 24July 2025 to Written Question E-002236/2025.

39. Amendment 48Rejected

    Paragraph 78 c (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 78c. Notes that the United States designated Antifa as a domestic terrorist organisation on 22 September 2025; condemns politically motivated violence committed by organisations and networks operating under the Antifa label; considers activities under this label to be an international phenomenon that shows both signs of international coordination and hence foreign interference; calls on the Member States to investigate identifiable Antifa organisations and networks suspected of terrorist acts and on the Council to place on the EU terrorist list organisations that meet the criteria of the Council Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism1a; ____________________ 1a Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj).

40. Amendment 49Rejected

    Paragraph 79 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson · ESN

    Added: 79a. Stresses the importance of mapping networks of Islamist organisations, training elected officials and administrations, protecting independent research and improving due-diligence mechanisms; calls for particular scrutiny of foreign funding from third countries promoting illiberal objectives;

41. Amendment 50Rejected

    Paragraph 79 b (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson · ESN

    Added: 79b. Notes with grave concern that criminal investigations in several Member States indicate that Hamas has established operational structures in Europe involving weapons depots and preparations for attacks against Jewish, Israeli and Western targets; calls for intensified intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation to identify and dismantle Hamas networks, logistics, financing and online recruitment in the EU;

42. Amendment 51Rejected

    Paragraph 80

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    … to exert political pressure on front-line Member States and on the EU; Removed: underlines that such practices also represent a grave abuse of vulnerable persons who may be entitled to international protection and should not adversely affect the right to seek asylum; Added: urges the Commission to propose further legislation enabling Member States, in cases of instrumentalisation, to refuse access to asylum procedures at the external border, in accordance with EU and international law; notes the specific provisions on the instrumentalisation of migration recently included in … area and ensuring full respect for the fundamental values of the EU; Added: calls for EU funding for physical border infrastructure requested by affected Member States; calls for rapid operational support from Frontex;

43. Amendment 51Rejected

    Paragraph 80

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    … to exert political pressure on front-line Member States and on the EU; Removed: underlines that such practices also represent a grave abuse of vulnerable persons who may be entitled to international protection and should not adversely affect the right to seek asylum; Added: urges the Commission to propose further legislation enabling Member States, in cases of instrumentalisation, to refuse access to asylum procedures at the external border, in accordance with EU and international law; notes the specific provisions on the instrumentalisation of migration recently included in … area and ensuring full respect for the fundamental values of the EU; Added: calls for EU funding for physical border infrastructure requested by affected Member States; calls for rapid operational support from Frontex;

44. Amendment 52Rejected

    Paragraph 80 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson · ESN

    Added: 80a. Condemns the July 2026 mass crossing into Ceuta as a hybrid attack against Spain and the EU’s external border; calls for a full investigation into its coordination through social media and any involvement by third-country authorities, and for solidarity with Spain in securing the EU’s external border;

45. Amendment 53Rejected

    Paragraph 99

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    99. Removed: Expresses its strong disagreement with the recent Added: Welcomes the recognition in the 2025 US National Security Removed: Strategy, in particular its negative characterisation of the EU and its challenges and risks, and the vision of international relations that is based on spheres of influence; condemns any attempts to influence or undermine democratic processes in the EU; stresses the importance of safeguarding the integrity of EU institutions and EU decision-making; expresses concerns about the fact that certain elements of the strategy fall significantly short in adequately addressing the threat posed by Russia, notably for European and hence also for American security; regrets, furthermore, the strategy’s flawed assessment of the EU as a political system and its groundless adversarial stance towards the EU; considers that the strategy further reinforces the imperative for the EU to advance its strategic autonomy, reduce dependencies and diversify partnerships; Added: Strategy that Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States, that transatlantic trade is a pillar of mutual prosperity and that the United States needs a strong Europe; considers this a firm basis for renewed transatlantic cooperation between sovereign democratic allies;

46. Amendment 54Rejected

    Paragraph 107 a (new)

    Tabled by Christine Anderson, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 107a. Recalls that, subject to the Treaties and EU law, the organisation, conduct and supervision of national elections remain the responsibility of the Member States; rejects any mandate for EU bodies to monitor or assess the lawful political positions or speech of parties, candidates or elected representatives;

47. Amendment 55Rejected

    Paragraph 115 a (new)

    Tabled by Sarah Knafo, Marcin Sypniewski · ESN

    Added: 115a. Recalls that unanimity within the Council in matters relating to the common foreign and security policy, including for the adoption of sanctions, remains a fundamental guarantee of Member States’ sovereignty and of the democratic legitimacy of decisions affecting their national interests;

48. Amendment 56Adopted

    Recital BT a (new)

    Tabled by Nathalie Loiseau, Gilles Boyer, Grégory Allione +37 · Members

    Added: BTa. whereas operations to manipulate information have already been detected against three candidates for France’s 2027 presidential election and have been attributed to Russia;

49. Amendment 57Adopted

    Paragraph 5 a (new)

    Tabled by Nathalie Loiseau, Gilles Boyer, Grégory Allione +39 · Members

    Added: 5a. Condemns third-country interference in certain outermost regions and overseas countries and territories, where the impact may be further compounded by their isolation and geographical distance from the European continent;

50. Amendment 58Rejected

    Paragraph 4 a (new)

    Tabled by Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński · ECR

    Added: 4a. Stresses that Russia constitutes the principal and most persistent state threat to the security, sovereignty and democratic resilience of Europe; underlines that Russia’s aggression, coercion and interference cannot be understood as isolated consequences of the current regime, but form part of a long-standing pattern of Russian imperial policy, manifested under Tsarist, Soviet and Putinist rule through military aggression, violations of sovereignty, political subversion and attempts to dominate neighbouring states; considers that European policy towards Russia must therefore be based on strategic realism rather than on recurring illusions of normalisation or a ‘reset’; calls for an honest assessment of the political, economic and institutional decisions that have led to Europe’s excessive dependence on Russia, including past attempts to pursue privileged political and economic relations with Moscow despite repeated warnings from Member States most exposed to Russian aggression; stresses that such policies have undermined European solidarity, contributed to strategic dependencies and provided the Kremlin with additional resources and leverage; insists that there must be no return to ‘business as usual’ with Russia and that any future relationship must be conditional on a fundamental and verified change in Russian conduct, full respect for international law and the sovereignty of neighbouring states;

51. Amendment 60Rejected

    Paragraph 4 c (new)

    Tabled by Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński · ECR

    Added: 4c. Underlines that the experience and threat assessments of Member States that have for decades warned against Russian imperialism, particularly Poland and the Baltic States, must be taken seriously in shaping European security policy; stresses that deterrence, resilience, strong national defence capabilities, secure critical infrastructure and unwavering support for states threatened or attacked by Russia must take precedence over short-term economic interests or attempts to accommodate the Kremlin; concludes that defending European democracy requires confronting the source of the threat rather than repeating policies that have underestimated it;

52. Amendment 65Rejected

    Paragraph 13 d (new)

    Tabled by Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński · ECR

    Added: 13d. Recalls the controversy surrounding the Commission’s defence of Pablo González, alias Pavel Rubtsov, who was identified by the Polish authorities as an agent of Russian military intelligence acting under journalistic cover; regrets that, despite numerous calls for it to do so, the Commission never corrected its unfounded and unjust accusations against the Polish Government in its rule of law report; insists that the credibility of the EU’s rule-of-law and democratic-resilience policies requires identical standards, legal criteria and scrutiny, regardless of which political forces govern a Member State;

53. Amendment 72Rejected

    Paragraph 132 a (new)

    Tabled by Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński · ECR

    Added: 132a. Stresses that the credibility of the EU’s efforts to counter foreign interference, corruption and malign influence depends first and foremost on its willingness to address vulnerabilities within its own institutions with the same determination and transparency that it expects from the Member States; recalls that foreign interference does not operate solely through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks or external influence operations, but may also exploit corruption, bribery, conflicts of interest, opaque lobbying, revolving-door practices, inadequate scrutiny of external contacts and weaknesses in the control of EU funding; recalls, in this regard, the serious institutional vulnerabilities exposed by the ‘Qatargate’ corruption scandal, which demonstrated the capacity of third-country interests to seek influence within Parliament through financial inducements, intermediaries and covert networks; further recalls the conviction of former MEPs for accepting bribes in return for activities promoting pro-Russian interests, including parliamentary interventions, which constitutes a particularly serious example of foreign financial influence reaching directly into parliamentary activity; considers that such cases must be treated not merely as individual instances of misconduct but as warnings concerning the resilience, integrity and security of the EU’s own democratic institutions; draws particular attention, in this context, to the money-laundering charges brought against former EU Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders, and to reports of his close contacts with Russian nationals, including a sanctioned oligarch close to Putin, at a time when the Commissioner was also responsible for the implementation of sanctions; calls on the Commission to cooperate with the relevant authorities and services and to take its own steps to clarify how the allegations against Commissioner Reynders may have affected the exercise of his duties, including whether they undermined the EU’s policy towards Russia and whether they contributed to unjustified attacks against Poland, a frontline Member State and a key country in supporting Ukraine; strongly condemns revolving-door practices whereby former senior political office-holders assume remunerated positions or advisory roles in state-controlled companies or structures linked to authoritarian third countries, as illustrated by the involvement of former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder with the Russian energy sector; stresses that such relationships may create dependencies, conflicts of interest and opportunities for foreign leverage and may severely damage public confidence in European decision-making;

54. Amendment 73Rejected

    Paragraph 132 b (new)

    Tabled by Beata Szydło, Mariusz Kamiński · ECR

    Added: 132b. Calls on Parliament, the Commission and all EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to conduct regular assessments of their exposure to corruption, covert foreign influence and conflicts of interest and to ensure appropriate follow-up where vulnerabilities are identified; underlines that democratic resilience cannot be credible if allegations or cases involving the EU institutions themselves are downplayed while increasingly intrusive standards of transparency, integrity and democratic scrutiny are demanded from Member States; insists that the same standards of accountability, transparency and institutional integrity must apply at EU and national levels and that protecting European democracy must begin with ensuring the integrity of the institutions that claim to be responsible for defending it;

55. Amendment 78Rejected

    Recital BZ

    Tabled by Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło · ECR

    … and the downplaying of the threat posed by Russia and China; whereas Added: for decades the EU and certain Member States have pursued, and sought to impose on other Member States, misguided and dangerous policies of economic, political and even military engagement with Russia and China, disregarding repeated warnings from the United States and several Central and Eastern European Member States; whereas these policies resulted in serious energy and economic dependencies on authoritarian regimes, contributed to the security crises Europe faces today, and weakened Europe’s strategic resilience; whereas the Nord Stream pipelines stand as a particularly striking example of these shameful policy failures; whereas the National Security Strategy also includes critical references to alleged democratic shortcomings in certain EU Member Removed: States and announces actions akin to foreign interference; Added: States, which the EU institutions have, for ideological and political reasons, failed to acknowledge and lacked the courage to address on their merits; whereas the strategy frames global developments largely in terms of economic nationalism and strategic interests, revealing a more transactional approach to traditional Removed: allies and thus questioning the principles that have underpinned US foreign policy for decades; Added: allies, whom the United States has for years, largely without success, urged to fulfil their Alliance commitments and make meaningful investments in their own security and defence;

56. Amendment 80Rejected

    Recital CL

    Tabled by Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło · ECR

    … and their staff have access to sensitive information and documents within Parliament; Added: whereas a Russian influence network operating in and around Parliament was exposed following an investigation by the Polish security services and their international partners; whereas the existence and methods of this network were subsequently confirmed by the conviction of former MEP Nathan Gill by a British court for accepting bribes in exchange for speeches in the European Parliament serving Russian interests; whereas, according to the findings of the Polish services, Russian operatives paid a network involving several MEPs to deliver speeches written on behalf of Russian interests and to participate in initiatives orchestrated by them, including the observation of sham elections and referendums in Russian-occupied territories;

57. Amendment 82Rejected

    Paragraph 65

    Tabled by Mariusz Kamiński, Beata Szydło · ECR

    … accompanied by active monitoring, surveillance and response in cooperation with relevant third-country Removed: partners; Added: partners, including Taiwan’s experience in protecting critical undersea infrastructure; draws attention to the inadequacy of the existing international legal framework for attributing such acts and holding accountable both their perpetrators and those who order, direct or sponsor them, particularly when attacks are carried out beyond territorial waters or through vessels sailing under flags of convenience; stresses that the current system for enforcing accountability for the deliberate destruction or sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure remains insufficient and calls for concrete efforts to close these legal and enforcement gaps;

58. Amendment 86Rejected

    Paragraph 115

    Tabled by Geadis Geadi, Emmanouil Fragkos, Galato Alexandraki +1 · ECR

    … markets and financial systems, and other effective, robust and impactful restrictive measures; Removed: reiterates its call on the Council to gradually transition to qualified majority voting for decisions in areas of Added: stresses that decisions on sanctions under the common foreign and security policy Removed: such as sanctions; Added: should continue to be taken by unanimity, as this constitutes an essential safeguard of the sovereign equality of the Member States, ensures that the vital national interests and security concerns of each Member State are duly taken into account and strengthens the legitimacy, cohesion and durability of common EU action;

59. Amendment 88Rejected

    Paragraph 2 a (new)

    Tabled by Cristian Terheş · ECR

    Added: 2a. Recognises that ‘reflexive control’, a concept originating in Soviet military theory and defined as the deliberate shaping of an adversary’s decision-making environment through the transmission of carefully calibrated information, seeks to induce the target to adopt decisions that advance the influencing actor’s strategic objectives; notes with concern that the Russian Federation has incorporated such techniques into its broader hybrid influence operations targeting democratic institutions, electoral processes and policy formation; stresses that these practices, which extend beyond conventional disinformation, exploit cognitive biases, institutional vulnerabilities and cultural narratives in order to distort perception, encourage miscalculation and influence outcomes without the use of overt coercion, thereby undermining rational decision-making and democratic governance;

60. Amendment 92Rejected

    Paragraph 48

    Tabled by Cristian Terheş · ECR

    … credible and effective, fact-checking organisations must uphold strict standards of political neutrality, Removed: independence from online platform providers, and methodological objectivity; Added: methodological objectivity and independence in their editorial conclusions from governments, political parties and online platform providers; calls on fact-checking organisations receiving EU funding to disclose their funding sources, methodology, conflicts of interest and correction procedures; stresses that publicly funded fact-checking organisations must not exercise regulatory or content-removal powers and that their assessments must not be used as a substitute for determinations by competent regulatory or judicial authorities; emphasises the importance of collaboration between fact-checkers, OSINT researchers, journalists, communicators and …

61. Amendment 94Rejected

    Paragraph 88 c (new)

    Tabled by Cristian Terheş · ECR

    Added: 88c. Underlines the importance of strengthening faith-based engagement and dialogue as part of the EU’s broader resilience strategy, promoting structured and transparent cooperation between the EU, the Member States and legitimate religious actors in order to counter hybrid threats, disinformation and the instrumentalisation of religion, while fully respecting freedom of religion or belief and pluralism;