Votación en el Parlamento Europeo
Modificación del Reglamento (UE) 2021/1232 en lo que respecta a la prórroga de su período de aplicación
Resultado general
Rechazada- 172 A favor
- 435 En contra
- 14 Abstención
- 97 No votó
Cómo contamos
- Los votos A favor, En contra y Abstención provienen del acta de votación nominal del Parlamento Europeo.
- «No ha votado» se deriva: eurodiputados con mandato el día de la votación para los que no se registró ningún voto. Las abstenciones no cuentan para esto.
- Las correcciones de voto posteriores se muestran pero no cambian el resultado oficial.
- Cada votación (votación global, enmienda, votación parcial) cuenta por separado. Por eso los totales pueden diferir de páginas que cuentan de forma distinta.
No se vota el contenido del texto, sino una propuesta de rechazarlo en su conjunto. Votar a favor equivale, por tanto, a votar en contra del texto; si la propuesta se rechaza, el procedimiento continúa.
Estado y procedimiento
Resultado según el Parlamento Europeo.
- Votación celebrada el
- Último paso documentado
- Diario Oficial · (hace 108 días)
- Próximo paso previsto
- La fuente no prevé ningún otro paso.
- Publicación en el Diario Oficial documentada
Desarrollo del procedimiento
2025/0429(COD) · COD
Actividades documentadas del procedimiento. No demuestran que una ley haya entrado en vigor.
- Documentado: Remisión
- Documentado: Examen en comisión
- Documentado: Pleno
- Documentado: Negociaciones
- Documentado: Pleno
- Documentado: Remisión
- Documentado: Pleno
- Documentado: Otras actividades
- Documentado: Firma
- Último documentado: Diario Oficial
Actividades documentadas (31)
- Remisión a comisión
- Presentación del informe en comisión
- Presentación de enmiendas en comisión
- Aprobación del informe en comisión
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Texto modificado en el pleno
- Remitido de nuevo a comisión para negociaciones interinstitucionales
- Votación en el pleno
- Resultados de la votación en el pleno
- Negociaciones interinstitucionales
- Negociaciones interinstitucionales
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Posición del Parlamento en primera lectura
- Votación en el pleno
- Resultados de la votación en el pleno
- Remisión a comisión
- Votación en el pleno
- Otra actividad documentada
- Votación en el pleno
- Firma
- Publicación en el Diario Oficial
Actividades previstas (realización no confirmada)
- Votación en el pleno
- Votación en el pleno
- Votación de la solicitud de procedimiento de urgencia
- Votación en el pleno
Ficha del procedimiento (OEIL) · Datos del Parlamento Europeo
Consultado:
Fuentes
Datos: EP Open Data API
¿De qué se trata?
- Rechazo de la prórroga del Reglamento (UE) 2021/1232
- Exigencia de retirada de la propuesta COM(2025)0797
- Transmisión de la posición al Consejo y la Comisión
Historial de enmiendas (15)
Texto tal como lo publica el PE, en inglés.
Article -1 (new)
Presentada por Birgit Sippel · S&D
Añadido: Article -1 In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (a) is replaced by the following: (a) the processing is: (i) strictly necessary for the use of specific technology for the sole purpose of detecting and removing known online child sexual abuse material and reporting it to law enforcement authorities and to organisations acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse; (ii) proportionate and limited to technologies used by providers for the purpose set out in point (i); (iii) limited to content data that are strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (iv) limited to what is strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (v) not applied to interpersonal communications to which end-to-end encryption is, has been or will be applied;
Article -1 a (new)
Presentada por Birgit Sippel · S&D
Añadido: Article -1a In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (b) is replaced by the following: (b) the technologies used for the purpose set out in point (a)(i) of this paragraph are in accordance with the state of the art in the industry and are the least privacy-intrusive, including with regard to the principle of data protection by design and by default laid down in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, to the extent that they are used to scan text in communications, they are not able to deduce the substance of the content of the communications but are solely able to detect patterns which point to possible online child sexual abuse, and, where such technologies are used for the detection of solicitation of children or previously unidentified online child sexual abuse material, such use shall be limited to cases where the provider has received a concrete report or notification from a user, a trusted flagger, or an organisation acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse concerning a specific communication, account or interaction indicating a reasonable suspicion of online child sexual abuse, and the detection shall be strictly limited to what is necessary in relation to that reported case.
Article -1 a (new)
Presentada por Birgit Sippel · S&D
Añadido: Article -1a In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (b) is replaced by the following: (b) the technologies used for the purpose set out in point (a)(i) of this paragraph are in accordance with the state of the art in the industry and are the least privacy-intrusive, including with regard to the principle of data protection by design and by default laid down in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, to the extent that they are used to scan text in communications, they are not able to deduce the substance of the content of the communications but are solely able to detect patterns which point to possible online child sexual abuse, and, where such technologies are used for the detection of solicitation of children or previously unidentified online child sexual abuse material, such use shall be limited to cases where the provider has received a concrete report or notification from a user, a trusted flagger, or an organisation acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse concerning a specific communication, account or interaction indicating a reasonable suspicion of online child sexual abuse, and the detection shall be strictly limited to what is necessary in relation to that reported case.
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Presentada por Birgit Sippel · S&D
It shall apply until 3
Eliminado: April 2028.Añadido: August 2027.Article -1 a (new)
Presentada por Markéta Gregorová · Verts/ALE
Añadido: Article -1a In Article 3(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, the following point is added: (ia) targeted, specified and limited to individual users, a specific group of users, either as such or as subscribers to a specific channel of communication, in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds of suspicion for a link, even an indirect one, with child sexual abuse material, and which have been identified by the competent judicial authority;
Recital 3 c (new)
Presentada por António Tânger Corrêa, Jaroslav Bžoch · PfE
Añadido: (3 c) The mere existence of voluntary detection measures by the providers does not relieve the co-legislators from ensuring that any temporary derogation fully respects the prohibition of general monitoring under Union law and the requirements of articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.
Recital 5 a (new)
Presentada por António Tânger Corrêa, Jaroslav Bžoch · PfE
Añadido: (5 a) Nothing in this Regulation shall prohibit, weaken, undermine or circumvent end-to-end encryption, and providers shall not be prevented nor discouraged for offering end-to-end encrypted services.
Recital 4 a (new)
Presentada por Marion Maréchal, Laurence Trochu, Nicolas Bay +5 · ECR
Añadido: (4a) The Union remains fully committed to protecting children and to pursuing a zero-tolerance approach towards any form of sexual abuse or exploitation that threatens their safety, dignity and integrity. At the same time, the protection of children must be ensured in full respect of fundamental rights, including the right to privacy and the confidentiality of communications as guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Nothing in this Regulation should therefore be construed as permitting, requiring or encouraging the weakening, circumvention or undermining of end-to-end encryption. Providers should remain free to offer and develop end-to-end encrypted services without restriction. The application of the derogation and any detection technologies must not interfere with or bypass end-to-end encryption, nor require the introduction of backdoors or other technical means that would compromise the integrity of encrypted communications. Any measures implemented under this Regulation must fully respect the essence of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications.
Article -1
Presentada por Birgit Sippel · S&D
Añadido: Article-1 In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (a) is replaced by the following (a) the processing is: (i) strictly necessary for the use of specific technology for the sole purpose of detecting and removing known online child sexual abuse material and reporting it to law enforcement authorities and to organisations acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse; (ii) proportionate and limited to technologies used by providers for the purpose set out in point (i); (iii) limited to content data that are strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (iv) limited to what is strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (v) not applied to interpersonal communications to which end-to-end encryption is, has been or will be applied;
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Presentada por Birgit Sippel · S&D
It shall apply until 3
Eliminado: April 2028.Añadido: August 2027.Recital 4 a (new)
Presentada por Assita Kanko, Nicolas Bay · ECR
Añadido: (4 a) The Union remains fully committed to protecting children and to pursuing a zero-tolerance approach towards any form of sexual abuse or exploitation that threatens their safety, dignity and integrity. At the same time, the protection of children should be ensured in full respect of fundamental rights, including the right to privacy and the confidentiality of communications as guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Nothing in Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 should therefore be construed as permitting, requiring or encouraging the weakening, circumvention or undermining of end-to-end encryption. Providers should remain free to offer and develop end-to-end encrypted services without restriction. The application of the derogation and any detection technologies should not interfere with or bypass end-to-end encryption, nor require the introduction of backdoors or other technical means that would compromise the integrity of encrypted communications. Any measures implemented under Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 should fully respect the essence of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications.
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Presentada por Assita Kanko, Nicolas Bay · ECR
It shall apply until 3 April
Eliminado: 2028.Añadido: 2027.Article 1 d (new)
Presentada por Markéta Gregorová · Verts/ALE
Añadido: Article1d Article -1a In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (a) is replaced by the following: (a) the processing is: (i) strictly necessary for the use of specific technology for the sole purpose of detecting and removing known online child sexual abuse material and reporting it to law enforcement authorities and to organisations acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse; (ii) proportionate and limited to technologies used by providers for the purpose set out in point (i); (iii) limited to content data that are strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (iv) limited to what is strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i);
Article 1 e (new)
Presentada por Markéta Gregorová · Verts/ALE
Añadido: Article1e Article -1b In Article 3(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, the following point is added: (ia) targeted, specified and limited to individual users, a specific group of users, either as such or as subscribers to a specific channel of communication, in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds of suspicion for a link, even an indirect one, with child sexual abuse material, and which have been identified by the competent judicial authority;
Article 1 f (new)
Presentada por Markéta Gregorová · Verts/ALE
Añadido: Article1f Article -1c In Article 3(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, the following point is added: (ib) not applied to interpersonal communications to which end-to-end encryption is, has been or will be applied;
Voto por grupo político
Cómo votaron los grupos políticos
- 21A favor
- 4En contra
- 1Abstención
- 5No votó
- 18A favor
- 95En contra
- 0Abstención
- 22No votó
- 39A favor
- 2En contra
- 1Abstención
- 4No votó
- 43A favor
- 0En contra
- 4Abstención
- 6No votó
- 12A favor
- 7En contra
- 5Abstención
- 4No votó
- 11A favor
- 57En contra
- 0Abstención
- 8No votó
- 17A favor
- 45En contra
- 0Abstención
- 22No votó
- 10A favor
- 65En contra
- 0Abstención
- 6No votó
- 1A favor
- 160En contra
- 3Abstención
- 20No votó
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