Votación en el Parlamento Europeo
Banco Central Europeo: Informe Anual 2025
Resultado general
Aprobada- 443 A favor
- 71 En contra
- 117 Abstención
- 87 No votó
Cómo contamos
- Los votos A favor, En contra y Abstención provienen del acta de votación nominal del Parlamento Europeo.
- «No ha votado» se deriva: eurodiputados con mandato el día de la votación para los que no se registró ningún voto. Las abstenciones no cuentan para esto.
- Las correcciones de voto posteriores se muestran pero no cambian el resultado oficial.
- Cada votación (votación global, enmienda, votación parcial) cuenta por separado. Por eso los totales pueden diferir de páginas que cuentan de forma distinta.
Estado y procedimiento
Resultado según el Parlamento Europeo.
- Votación celebrada el
- Último paso documentado
- Pleno · (hace 301 días)
- Próximo paso previsto
- La fuente no prevé ningún otro paso.
Desarrollo del procedimiento
2025/2182(INI) · INI
Actividades documentadas del procedimiento. No demuestran que una ley haya entrado en vigor.
- Documentado: Remisión
- Documentado: Examen en comisión
- Último documentado: Pleno
Actividades documentadas (18)
- Remisión a comisión
- Presentación del informe en comisión
- Presentación de enmiendas en comisión
- Aprobación del informe en comisión
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Presentación al pleno
- Debate en el pleno
- Votación en el pleno
- Resultados de la votación en el pleno
Actividades previstas (realización no confirmada)
- Debate en el pleno
- Votación en el pleno
Ficha del procedimiento (OEIL) · Datos del Parlamento Europeo
Consultado:
Fuentes
Datos: EP Open Data API
¿De qué se trata?
- El informe evalúa la política monetaria del Banco Central Europeo (BCE) para 2025, destacando la estabilidad de precios como objetivo principal.
- Critica la respuesta tardía del BCE a la inflación postpandemia y pide un enfoque cauteloso y basado en datos para la flexibilización monetaria.
- Se subraya la independencia del BCE como esencial, al tiempo que se exige mayor transparencia y rendición de cuentas ante el Parlamento Europeo.
- La reducción gradual de los programas de compra de bonos soberanos y evitar distorsiones en el mercado se consideran prioridades clave.
- Además, se enfatiza la importancia de la estabilidad financiera y el papel internacional del euro.
Historial de enmiendas (20)
Texto tal como lo publica el PE, en inglés.
- Enmienda 2Aprobada
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Presentada por Jussi Saramo, Manon Aubry · The Left
Añadido: 9a. Expresses concern over the high cost of living, as food and energy prices have increased in Europe since the COVID-19 pandemic; notes that, on average, the price of a meal in the euro area in 2025 was one third higher than before the pandemic1a, and that this has particularly affected low-income households. 1a European Central Bank blog, ‘When groceries bite, the role of food prices for inflation in the euro area’, 25 September 2025.
- Enmienda 3Rechazada
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Presentada por Jussi Saramo · The Left
Añadido: 9b. Notes that national inflation rates can vary significantly within the euro area, with some countries suffering from deflationary rather than inflationary pressures, which can further harm the economy;
- Enmienda 4Rechazada
Paragraph 27
Presentada por Jussi Saramo, Manon Aubry · The Left
27.
Eliminado: Supports the ECB in its efforts to accommodateAñadido: Calls on the ECB to reduce the EU’s financial dependence on US assets by strengthening the international role of theEliminado: euro through, inter alia, sufficient currency swap and repo lines;Añadido: euro; calls on the ECB to be prepared for a possible ‘sell America’ scenario, in which public and private institutions would sell off US assets on a large scale in the context of increasing US aggression; - Enmienda 5Rechazada
Paragraph 28 a (new)
Presentada por Charlie Weimers, Dick Erixon, Beatrice Timgren · ECR
Añadido: 28a. Emphasises in this context that every Member State has the right to decide whether to adopt the euro;
- Enmienda 7Aprobada
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Presentada por Anouk Van Brug, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu · Renew
Añadido: 6a. Echoes the statement of solidarity with regard to the US Federal Reserve made by the ECB and central banks worldwide underlining the importance of preserving central bank independence, with full respect for the rule of law and democratic accountability.
- Enmienda 13Rechazada
Recital H a (new)
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
Añadido: Ha. whereas the convergence criteria are mathematical – not political – rules designed to prevent instability in the euro area, support price stability and act as a protector of people’s purchasing power and wealth; whereas the 3 % budget deficit rule is the mathematical upper limit to a sustained deficit so as to at least ensure the mere mathematical possibility of repayment of debt (no-Ponzi scheme condition) without resorting to higher inflation, while this calculated limit was based on the substantially stronger economic growth levels of the 1990s; whereas the breaking of the deficit criterion for various political reasons has become normal and now even institutionalised in the EU, while financial markets will only consider mathematical – not political – reasoning for their price and interest evaluation of sovereign bonds;
- Enmienda 19Rechazada
Paragraph 2
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
… a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; Añadido: criticises the fact that the ECB relies exclusively and blindly on a body subordinate to the Commission, Eurostat, to obtain a variety of essential data on which it bases its monetary policy and steers the euro, as in practice this undermines its independence, as its policy is reliant on data provided by a body subordinate to the Commission;
- Enmienda 22Rechazada
Paragraph 6
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
… 130 TFEU; emphasises that independence requires the ECB’s actions to remain apolitical; Añadido: reiterates that the economic rationale behind Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB is to prohibit the ECB from being used, directly or indirectly, to finance government spending by the Member States on the basis of political objectives; calls on the ECB to inform Parliament whether there have already been discussions within the board of the ECB to restart future asset purchase programmes, in order to counteract possible strong increases in interest rates on sovereign bonds caused by the current excessive spending of several Member States and the national escape clause;
- Enmienda 23Rechazada
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
Añadido: 6a. Strongly recommends the decentralisation of the ECB’s sources of macroeconomic input data, as well as the creation and use of intrinsic means for the continuous monitoring of potential systematic problems with such data, since it is so crucial for the formulation of its monetary policy and the monitoring of its primary objective;
- Enmienda 24Rechazada
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
Añadido: 6b. Points out the feasibility and statistical necessity, after more than two decades, of reviewing Eurostat’s key annual macroeconomic data by comparing compound annual macroeconomic growth and inflation figures with data from other sources using considerably longer time intervals than the current yearly intervals, in order to identify problems, systematic distortions or errors; stresses that errors or bias in annual data are difficult to detect, but if consistent or systematic bias or errors exist, this would become apparent over such longer periods, which now exist after more than two decades; calls on the ECB to carry out such statistical investigations and checks to ensure that it is steering the euro with an unbiased compass;
- Enmienda 27Rechazada
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
Añadido: 8a. Considers that the strong increase in money supply in the decade prior to the surge in inflation, which was mainly due to the zero interest-rate policy, the asset purchase programmes and, in particular, the sharp increase in money supply immediately prior to the surge, i.e. during the COVID-19 emergency measures, combined with the sudden increase in the velocity of money following the end of the COVID-19 restrictions, as well as the sudden supply contraction of essential resources as a result of EU sanctions, created a textbook case for a predictable sharp surge in inflation due to the neutrality of money;
- Enmienda 28Rechazada
Paragraph 9
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
… easing monetary policy should be prudent, data-driven and guided by price stability; Añadido: expresses concern about Member States’ increasing debt levels, their excessive deficit spending and the ensuing predictable effect on interest rates in several Member States, which will lead to renewed demands for ECB intervention with fresh money to lower interest rates via asset purchases, which in turn would result in increased monetary-induced price inflation in the years to come;
- Enmienda 29Rechazada
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
Añadido: 10a. Highlights that the so-called ‘cost-of-living crisis’ is just another term for the significant decline in the general population’s purchasing power, while monetary inflation and a low-growth environment are generally among the main economic causes of such declines; points out that inflation adjustments often at best only raise wages up to the officially reported level, such that if inflation is systematically under-reported, this would result in a sustained decline in real wages; points to the link between sustained expansionary monetary policy and property prices, and subsequently housing prices, in a fiat money system;
- Enmienda 30Rechazada
Paragraph 12
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
12. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are
Eliminado: unconventionalAñadido: highly questionable monetary policy toolsEliminado: that have side effects; notes in particular that asset purchase programmes can distort price signals;Añadido: undermining the principle of monetary dominance by indirectly financing excessive government spending via the downward manipulation of bond prices, and thus debt costs, at the expense of future price stability and, consequently, the real wealth and purchasing power of the entire population of the euro area; notes that the ECB started shrinking its balance sheet only very gradually; … - Enmienda 32Rechazada
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Presentada por Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN
Añadido: 18a. Points out that the protracted period of low and zero interest rates over the last decade has undermined creative destruction and economic evolution, as it prevented inefficient companies from being forced to exit the market, because they were able to stay afloat by taking out very cheap loans, which ultimately contributed to the lack of competitiveness of the EU economy, since this undermined this vital evolutionary economic process and led to material and human resources being tied up by very inefficient companies (‘zombie companies’) that would otherwise have disappeared from the market long ago;
- Enmienda 37Rechazada
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Presentada por Auke Zijlstra, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón +4 · PfE
Añadido: 20a. Highlights that environmental policy objectives should not be implemented using monetary policy tools;
- Enmienda 38Rechazada
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Presentada por Auke Zijlstra, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón +2 · PfE
Añadido: 27a. Stresses that the ECB should also take into account the potential drawbacks of the euro having a stronger international role and being a global reserve currency, including its potential overvaluation;
- Enmienda 39Rechazada
Paragraph 35
Presentada por Auke Zijlstra, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón +2 · PfE
35. Reiterates that the nominations to the ECB’s Executive Board should be
Eliminado: gender-balanced,merit and ability-based, with shortlists submitted to Parliament, and thatEliminado: people of all gendersAñadido: men and women should have equal opportunities to serve as governors of their respective national … - Enmienda 40Aprobada
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Presentada por Pasquale Tridico, Alessandro Zan, Anouk Van Brug +45 · Members
Añadido: 22a. Recalls that equal access to payment services is essential for participation in economic life; underlines that the increasing digitalisation of payments, if left exclusively to private and non-EU actors, risks creating new forms of exclusion for both users and merchants; stresses that an online and offline digital euro should contribute to safeguarding universal access to payments and broad acceptance by merchants across the EU, while fully respecting privacy and data protection standards;
- Enmienda 41Aprobada
Paragraph 23
Presentada por Pasquale Tridico, Alessandro Zan, Anouk Van Brug +45 · Members
23.
Eliminado: Takes note ofAñadido: Welcomes the ongoing discussions on the digital euro; Añadido: underlines that, in a context of heightened geopolitical uncertainty and excessive dependence on non-EU payment infrastructures, the introduction of a digital euro, designed to complement cash and private banking services, is essential to strengthen EU monetary sovereignty, reduce fragmentation in retail payments and support the integrity and resilience of the single market;
Voto por grupo político
Cómo votaron los grupos políticos
- 9A favor
- 15En contra
- 6Abstención
- 2No votó
- 14A favor
- 19En contra
- 8Abstención
- 5No votó
- 66A favor
- 1En contra
- 0Abstención
- 8No votó
- 167A favor
- 0En contra
- 0Abstención
- 20No votó
- 114A favor
- 1En contra
- 0Abstención
- 20No votó
- 45A favor
- 0En contra
- 0Abstención
- 8No votó
- 21A favor
- 12En contra
- 40Abstención
- 6No votó
- 7A favor
- 4En contra
- 59Abstención
- 14No votó
- 0A favor
- 19En contra
- 4Abstención
- 4No votó
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