Recommendation for the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-China political relations

Wording as published by the EP, in English.

1. Amendment 1Adopted

   Paragraph 1 – point e

   Tabled by Hilde Vautmans · Renew

   … the Chinese diplomatic backing and material assistance that sustains the Russian military-industrial Removed: complex; Added: complex ; in particular, express deep concern over credible evidence of China’s growing involvement in the supply chain for Russian Removed: weapons, Added: weapons and drones, including the provision of dual-use technologies, components, and high-tech equipment that directly bolster Russia’s capacity to strike Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure; Added: further express deep concern over verified reports that the Chinese military has trained Russian military personnel to fight in Ukraine;

2. Amendment 2Adopted

   Paragraph 1 – point n

   Tabled by Hilde Vautmans · Renew

   … States, ensuring that no single EU Member State faces economic coercion alone; Added: note that, following China’s economic coercion against Lithuania, bilateral relations, including diplomatic and economic relations, have not yet normalised;

3. Amendment 3Adopted

   Paragraph 1 – point am

   Tabled by Hilde Vautmans · Renew

   … forced labour and mass surveillance, at every political meeting with Chinese counterparts; Added: express deep concern over the adoption of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress and its potential to further institutionalise assimilationist policies and undermine the linguistic, cultural and religious rights of ethnic minorities; in particular, express deep concern regarding China’s systemic repression and forced assimilation policies in Tibet and Xinjiang, including attempts at forced Removed: Sinicisation Added: sinicisation and destruction of cultural heritage, such as interference in the processes Removed: of Added: for monitoring the election of Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leaders, and demand the immediate …

4. Amendment 4Adopted

   Paragraph 1 – point ao

   Tabled by Hilde Vautmans · Renew

   … and demand the unconditional release of political prisoners, including the 2019 Sakharov Removed: Prize laureate Added: Laureate Ilham Tohti, EU-citizen Gui Minhai, Gulshan Abbas, Gao Zhisheng, Yu Wensheng and … at a designated location, call for freedom of movement for 2008 Sakharov Removed: Prize laureate Added: Laureate Hu Jia and ask Removed: for news on his current status; insist that China frees the laureate of … Chow Hang-tung as well as Jimmy Lai, Benny Tai, Joshua Wong, Leung Removed: Kwok-hung, Added: Kwok hung, Owen Chow and individuals of Removed: the Hong Kong 47 group who remain imprisoned under the national security law; condemn the Added: prosecution of former pro-democracy lawmaker Au Kam San under Macao’s national security law and call for his immediate and unconditional release; condemn the use of the death penalty in China, and Removed: note Added: recall that the total estimated number of executions in China exceeds all other … punishment; support independent Chinese, Hong Kong, and diasporic civil-society actors, environmental defenders, Removed: labour rights Added: and labour-rights advocates and human rights defenders; call for an EU-China Civil-Society Dialogue Facility …

5. Amendment 16Rejected

   Paragraph 1 – point l

   Tabled by Danilo Della Valle · The Left

   … and resources in the area of climate change prevention and green transition Removed: also render the EU Removed: vulnerable; therefore, strengthen economic security-related actions in the area of green transition; in the light of the fact that China’s export of clean/green technologies is largely driven by industrial policy objectives and sustained by excessive state subsidies and export-oriented overcapacity, address the issue of unfair competition for European green-technology industries; Added: vulnerable and must be addressed; recognise, however, that cooperation with China in the field of green technology remains essential for European companies, given China’s position in the production and refining of critical raw materials and in the supply of clean-technology components; call for a balanced approach that combines de-risking and diversification of supply chains with sustained engagement with Beijing on areas of mutual interest, including climate action, renewable energy deployment and green innovation, in order to ensure both the competitiveness of European industries and the achievement of the EU’s climate objectives;

6. Amendment 20Rejected

   Paragraph 1 – point ab

   Tabled by Danilo Della Valle · The Left

   … is the guiding framework for the EU’s foreign policy decisions as regards Removed: Taiwan and that the EU has never endorsed the One China Principle and opposes any provocation or Added: Taiwan; oppose any unilateral attempt to Removed: violate Added: alter the status quo by force or Removed: coercion, or against the will of the Taiwanese people; work with Member States and other democratic partners in the region on closer security coordination, including a continuous naval presence and joint exercises, to reinforce stability in the region; fulfil the pledge made by the Commission before Parliament to work towards deterring China from provoking or escalating tensions with Taiwan; make clear that the EU will continue to develop its relations with the island in a number of areas, while adhering to the EU’s long-standing One China policy and encouraging Added: coercion; call for dialogue and constructive engagement across the Taiwan Removed: Strait; in this context, call on the United Nations to reject Chinese demands and grant Taiwanese passport holders – including tourists, journalists, NGO workers and political activists – access to tours and events in the United Nations; Added: Strait to reinforce stability in the region;

7. Amendment 21Rejected

   Paragraph 1 – point ac

   Tabled by Danilo Della Valle · The Left

   Removed: ac) actively engage in diplomatic efforts to push back against China’s escalation in the Taiwan Strait, the South and East China Sea; reaffirm unwavering support for freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific, in line with international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); strengthen maritime security cooperation with India and other Indo-Pacific partners in response to China’s expanding naval presence in the region and systematic attempts to severely undermine freedom of navigation; intensify dialogue with China with a view to strengthening the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and increasing transparency on the scope and activities of its fleet; Added: deleted

8. Amendment 22Rejected

   Paragraph 1 – point aw a (new)

   Tabled by Danilo Della Valle · The Left

   Added: awa) encourage the Commission and the Member States to systematically analyse China’s experience in long-term economic planning, industrial policy and large-scale public investment, with a particular focus on strengthening Europe’s industrial base and strategic autonomy, ensuring energy security and greater energy independence, accelerating the development and deployment of artificial intelligence and other key technologies, and driving the ecological and energy transition; call for this assessment to inform a more proactive and strategic EU economic policy framework, capable of mobilising public investment, supporting high-value industrial production and quality employment, reducing strategic dependencies, and delivering the Green Deal and technological transformation while strengthening social cohesion, rather than remaining constrained by a narrow neoliberal approach;

9. Amendment 23Rejected

   Paragraph 2 a (new)

   Tabled by Danilo Della Valle · The Left

   Added: 2a. Welcomes the significant contribution of China in recent decades to global poverty reduction, and calls for the EU and China to jointly launch an ‘EU-China Global Sustainable Development Initiative’ aimed at supporting low-income countries through infrastructure, renewable energy, health systems and education, urbanisation, sustainable agriculture, digital connectivity and climate-resilient infrastructure, with full respect for social and environmental standards and debt sustainability, thus combining EU regulatory strengths with China’s capacity for mobilising public investment;

10. Amendment 24Adopted

    Paragraph 1 – point am a (new)

    Tabled by Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Danuše Nerudová · PPE

    Added: ama) recall that the flash floods that struck the Nepal-Tibet border on 26 August 2026 caused mass casualties and destruction on both sides of the border; express regret that Chinese state media have reported casualty and missing-person figures for the Tibetan side that are markedly lower than those cited by international human rights organisations; deplore the fact that eyewitness footage and survivor accounts from Tibet have been removed from Chinese social media platforms, foreign journalists have been permitted only government-supervised access, and China’s Ministry of Public Security has confirmed that individuals were penalised for sharing information about the disaster; stress that this pattern of information control obstructs accountability to the disaster’s victims and their families; call on the Chinese authorities to grant immediate, unimpeded access to independent observers, journalists and humanitarian organisations to the Tibetan areas affected by the August 2026 Nepal-Tibet border floods, and to publish full and verifiable casualty data; call for accountability to the victims and their families;

11. Amendment 25Adopted

    Recital H

    Tabled by Mariusz Kamiński, Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen · ECR

    … own narrative of neutrality, including China’s own Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; Added: whereas China is directly involved in developing ammunition production capabilities in Belarus, including through the provision of key production equipment and production lines, further strengthening the military-industrial capacity available to support Russia’s war effort; whereas the People’s Republic of China continues to deepen its military cooperation with Russia and Belarus, including through joint military exercises, conducted even in the immediate vicinity of the EU, despite both countries engaging in hostile activities against Member States and posing a direct threat to European security;

12. Amendment 27Rejected

    Paragraph 1 – point h a (new)

    Tabled by Daniel Obajtek, Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen · ECR

    Added: ha) note with concern the surge in imports of silicon metal into the EU market from China and from third countries where Chinese production capacity has been established, which has contributed to a severe decline in EU production and profitability and is putting the viability of European production at risk; recall that silicon metal is classified as both a critical and a strategic raw material under Regulation (EU) 2024/12521a, and stress that the loss of EU production capacity would increase external dependencies and weaken the EU’s resilience, including in relation to the energy and digital transitions; note with concern that the definitive safeguard measures on certain ferro-alloys adopted by the Commission in November 2025 do not cover silicon metal; underline that silicon metal exported from China is used by industrial consumers as a substitute for ferrosilicon, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the safeguard measures applicable to ferrosilicon; further note that major trading partners, including the United States, Canada and Australia, have already introduced trade defence measures against imports of Chinese silicon metal, and stress that this situation risks increasing trade diversion towards the EU market; react without delay and adopt the effective trade defence measures necessary to address dumped and subsidised imports in order to preserve viable EU production capacity for silicon metal and ferro-alloys; -------- 1a Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 (OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj).

13. Amendment 29Adopted

    Paragraph 1 – point j b (new)

    Tabled by Marion Maréchal, Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen · ECR

    Added: jb) ensure the strict application of customs duties on small non-European parcels valued at EUR 150 or less, in force since the 1 July 2026, and of the EU-wide handling fee on small parcels applicable from 1 November 2026; check the effectiveness of existing measures in curbing the harmful effects of practices such as ‘ultra-fast fashion’; stand ready, where necessary, to urge Member State authorities to adopt any further action required to intensify and tighten controls on non-compliant, dangerous or unsafe goods often sold through Chinese online platforms (such as Temu, Shein, or AliExpress);

14. Amendment 30Adopted

    Paragraph 1 – point ab a (new)

    Tabled by Mariusz Kamiński, Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen · ECR

    Added: aba) reject China’s attempts to coerce international organisations, third countries and other actors into restricting Taiwan’s international participation and contacts, as recently demonstrated by the pressure exerted by Beijing over the participation of Taiwan’s Vice-President Hsiao Bi-khim in the Ventotene European Conference for Freedom and Democracy organised by the European Parliament;

15. Amendment 31Adopted

    Paragraph 1 – point aq a (new)

    Tabled by Mariusz Kamiński, Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen · ECR

    Added: aqa) preserve and honour the memory of the victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre and actively counter the Chinese authorities’ attempts to erase this crime from public memory; task the EU Delegation in Beijing with commemorating the victims every year on 4 June, including by lowering the EU flag to half mast, displaying candles in the windows of the EU Delegation or undertaking other appropriate symbolic acts of remembrance; initiate and support activities aimed at preserving the historical record of the massacre and ensuring that its memory is passed on to future generations; recognise the Tiananmen Square massacre as a defining moment in China’s modern history and as a stark warning of the totalitarian direction subsequently pursued by the Chinese Communist Party;

16. Amendment 40Adopted

    Recital AO

    Tabled by Yannis Maniatis, Kathleen Van Brempt, Nacho Sánchez Amor · S&D

    … is therefore needed to determine the EU’s future in global affairs; whereas Removed: such a policy Added: the EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership should be based on the current geopolitical situation and therefore have a clear focus on Removed: security as well as on the EU’s strategic autonomy and reciprocity; Added: the EU’s values, strategic autonomy, interests and priorities, including security;

17. Amendment 42Adopted

    Paragraph 1 – point ao a (new)

    Tabled by Yannis Maniatis, Kathleen Van Brempt, Nacho Sánchez Amor · S&D

    Added: aoa) firmly call on the Chinese authorities to repeal Article 63 of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which purports to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over individuals residing in third countries and constitutes a direct violation of international law and the sovereign jurisdiction of the EU Member States; develop an EU-wide framework for identifying and countering transnational repression on European soil;

18. Amendment 43Adopted

    Paragraph 1 – point ao b (new)

    Tabled by Yannis Maniatis, Kathleen Van Brempt, Nacho Sánchez Amor · S&D

    Added: aob) reiterate that human rights are universal, indivisible and inalienable, and cannot be characterised as internal affairs; call on China to ratify the ICCPR without further delay and to comply fully with its provisions in the meantime, including in Hong Kong where the covenant is legally binding pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and takes precedence over national security legislation; suspend all extradition arrangements to Hong Kong pending the full restoration of judicial independence and freedom of expression guarantees; agree, with China, on a concrete and time-bound roadmap for tangible and verifiable progress in the EU–China Human Rights Dialogue, moving beyond procedural exchanges to substantive outcomes;

19. Amendment 48Rejected

    Recital A a (new)

    Tabled by Milan Uhrík, Petar Volgin · ESN

    Added: Aa. whereas the autonomous and consistent foreign policy of the EU should be based on the principles of peace, stability and mutual respect, while safeguarding the security and economic and other legitimate interests of the Member States and their citizens;

20. Amendment 51Rejected

    Recital G a (new)

    Tabled by Milan Uhrík, Petar Volgin, Stanislav Stoyanov · ESN

    Added: Ga. whereas cooperation should serve the economic resilience, industrial competitiveness and long-term prosperity of the Member States; whereas the EU should therefore pursue a pragmatic and balanced policy to this end, while respecting the sovereignty and legitimate political choices of its international partners and avoiding unnecessary ideological confrontation or attempts to prescribe political models beyond the scope of international agreements and good relations;

21. Amendment 52Rejected

    Recital L a (new)

    Tabled by Milan Uhrík · ESN

    Added: La. whereas effective diplomacy and capable policymaking in the future would be able to contribute to shaping the EU’s economic and international relations in a manner that strengthens its industrial, technological and strategic capabilities, diversifies critical supply chains and limits avoidable dependencies and undue economic or strategic pressure on the EU and its Member States;

22. Amendment 55Rejected

    Recital N a (new)

    Tabled by Milan Uhrík · ESN

    Added: Na. whereas the EU’s growing dependency on external producers in certain sectors is also the result of policy choices that have affected the competitiveness, investment conditions and productive capacity of European industry; whereas the implementation of climate policies, including measures adopted under the European Green Deal, have weakened the EU’s own capacity to produce essential goods and technologies and thereby increase its dependency on external actors;

23. Amendment 56Rejected

    Recital N b (new)

    Tabled by Tomasz Froelich · ESN

    Added: Nb. whereas the EU’s carbon pricing strategy penalises high emissions while China’s green tech strategy focuses on production of green tech rather than emissions reduction; whereas under the EU’s Emissions Trading System, the price of carbon is 7 to 10 times higher than China’s carbon price; whereas Chinese green tech helps to reduce the costs of renewable energy and electric vehicles, enabling China to flood the world market with its manufactures, while the country has not reduced coal production; whereas the EU’s climate policies unilaterally undermine the competitiveness of European companies in respect of industrial competitors across the world;

24. Amendment 67Rejected

    Paragraph 1 – point o a (new)

    Tabled by Sarah Knafo · ESN

    Added: oa) insist that access to the European single market and to European public procurement be conditional on genuine reciprocity in market access, investment conditions and public procurement; call for proportionate restrictions on Chinese companies where European companies are denied equivalent access to the Chinese market or are subject to discriminatory treatment;

25. Amendment 69Rejected

    Paragraph 1 – point y a (new)

    Tabled by Sarah Knafo · ESN

    Added: ya) ensure that no EU-funded infrastructure or investment projects contribute, directly or indirectly, to strategic dependency on Chinese companies, technologies, financing or supply chains;