Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 as regards the extension of its period of application

Wording as published by the EP, in English.

1. Amendment 1 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Adopted

   Article -1 (new)

   Tabled by Birgit Sippel · S&D

   Added: Article -1 In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (a) is replaced by the following: (a) the processing is: (i) strictly necessary for the use of specific technology for the sole purpose of detecting and removing known online child sexual abuse material and reporting it to law enforcement authorities and to organisations acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse; (ii) proportionate and limited to technologies used by providers for the purpose set out in point (i); (iii) limited to content data that are strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (iv) limited to what is strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (v) not applied to interpersonal communications to which end-to-end encryption is, has been or will be applied;

2. Amendment 2 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Adopted

   Article -1 a (new)

   Tabled by Birgit Sippel · S&D

   Added: Article -1a In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (b) is replaced by the following: (b) the technologies used for the purpose set out in point (a)(i) of this paragraph are in accordance with the state of the art in the industry and are the least privacy-intrusive, including with regard to the principle of data protection by design and by default laid down in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, to the extent that they are used to scan text in communications, they are not able to deduce the substance of the content of the communications but are solely able to detect patterns which point to possible online child sexual abuse, and, where such technologies are used for the detection of solicitation of children or previously unidentified online child sexual abuse material, such use shall be limited to cases where the provider has received a concrete report or notification from a user, a trusted flagger, or an organisation acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse concerning a specific communication, account or interaction indicating a reasonable suspicion of online child sexual abuse, and the detection shall be strictly limited to what is necessary in relation to that reported case.

3. Amendment 2 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Adopted

   Article -1 a (new)

   Tabled by Birgit Sippel · S&D

   Added: Article -1a In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (b) is replaced by the following: (b) the technologies used for the purpose set out in point (a)(i) of this paragraph are in accordance with the state of the art in the industry and are the least privacy-intrusive, including with regard to the principle of data protection by design and by default laid down in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, to the extent that they are used to scan text in communications, they are not able to deduce the substance of the content of the communications but are solely able to detect patterns which point to possible online child sexual abuse, and, where such technologies are used for the detection of solicitation of children or previously unidentified online child sexual abuse material, such use shall be limited to cases where the provider has received a concrete report or notification from a user, a trusted flagger, or an organisation acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse concerning a specific communication, account or interaction indicating a reasonable suspicion of online child sexual abuse, and the detection shall be strictly limited to what is necessary in relation to that reported case.

4. Amendment 3 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Adopted

   Article 1 – paragraph 1

   Tabled by Birgit Sippel · S&D

   It shall apply until 3 Removed: April 2028. Added: August 2027.

5. Amendment 5 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Adopted

   Article -1 a (new)

   Tabled by Markéta Gregorová · Verts/ALE

   Added: Article -1a In Article 3(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, the following point is added: (ia) targeted, specified and limited to individual users, a specific group of users, either as such or as subscribers to a specific channel of communication, in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds of suspicion for a link, even an indirect one, with child sexual abuse material, and which have been identified by the competent judicial authority;

6. Amendment 10 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Rejected

   Recital 3 c (new)

   Tabled by António Tânger Corrêa, Jaroslav Bžoch · PfE

   Added: (3 c) The mere existence of voluntary detection measures by the providers does not relieve the co-legislators from ensuring that any temporary derogation fully respects the prohibition of general monitoring under Union law and the requirements of articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.

7. Amendment 12 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Rejected

   Recital 5 a (new)

   Tabled by António Tânger Corrêa, Jaroslav Bžoch · PfE

   Added: (5 a) Nothing in this Regulation shall prohibit, weaken, undermine or circumvent end-to-end encryption, and providers shall not be prevented nor discouraged for offering end-to-end encrypted services.

8. Amendment 18 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Rejected

   Recital 4 a (new)

   Tabled by Marion Maréchal, Laurence Trochu, Nicolas Bay +5 · ECR

   Added: (4a) The Union remains fully committed to protecting children and to pursuing a zero-tolerance approach towards any form of sexual abuse or exploitation that threatens their safety, dignity and integrity. At the same time, the protection of children must be ensured in full respect of fundamental rights, including the right to privacy and the confidentiality of communications as guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Nothing in this Regulation should therefore be construed as permitting, requiring or encouraging the weakening, circumvention or undermining of end-to-end encryption. Providers should remain free to offer and develop end-to-end encrypted services without restriction. The application of the derogation and any detection technologies must not interfere with or bypass end-to-end encryption, nor require the introduction of backdoors or other technical means that would compromise the integrity of encrypted communications. Any measures implemented under this Regulation must fully respect the essence of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications.

9. Amendment 30 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Rejected

   Article -1

   Tabled by Birgit Sippel · S&D

   Added: Article-1 In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (a) is replaced by the following (a) the processing is: (i) strictly necessary for the use of specific technology for the sole purpose of detecting and removing known online child sexual abuse material and reporting it to law enforcement authorities and to organisations acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse; (ii) proportionate and limited to technologies used by providers for the purpose set out in point (i); (iii) limited to content data that are strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (iv) limited to what is strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (v) not applied to interpersonal communications to which end-to-end encryption is, has been or will be applied;

10. Amendment 31 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Rejected

    Article 1 – paragraph 1

    Tabled by Birgit Sippel · S&D

    It shall apply until 3 Removed: April 2028. Added: August 2027.

11. Amendment 32 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Rejected

    Recital 4 a (new)

    Tabled by Assita Kanko, Nicolas Bay · ECR

    Added: (4 a) The Union remains fully committed to protecting children and to pursuing a zero-tolerance approach towards any form of sexual abuse or exploitation that threatens their safety, dignity and integrity. At the same time, the protection of children should be ensured in full respect of fundamental rights, including the right to privacy and the confidentiality of communications as guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Nothing in Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 should therefore be construed as permitting, requiring or encouraging the weakening, circumvention or undermining of end-to-end encryption. Providers should remain free to offer and develop end-to-end encrypted services without restriction. The application of the derogation and any detection technologies should not interfere with or bypass end-to-end encryption, nor require the introduction of backdoors or other technical means that would compromise the integrity of encrypted communications. Any measures implemented under Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 should fully respect the essence of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications.

12. Amendment 33 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Rejected

    Article 1 – paragraph 1

    Tabled by Assita Kanko, Nicolas Bay · ECR

    It shall apply until 3 April Removed: 2028. Added: 2027.

13. Amendment 34 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Adopted

    Article 1 d (new)

    Tabled by Markéta Gregorová · Verts/ALE

    Added: Article1d Article -1a In Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, point (a) is replaced by the following: (a) the processing is: (i) strictly necessary for the use of specific technology for the sole purpose of detecting and removing known online child sexual abuse material and reporting it to law enforcement authorities and to organisations acting in the public interest against child sexual abuse; (ii) proportionate and limited to technologies used by providers for the purpose set out in point (i); (iii) limited to content data that are strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i); (iv) limited to what is strictly necessary for the purpose set out in point (i);

14. Amendment 35 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Rejected

    Article 1 e (new)

    Tabled by Markéta Gregorová · Verts/ALE

    Added: Article1e Article -1b In Article 3(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, the following point is added: (ia) targeted, specified and limited to individual users, a specific group of users, either as such or as subscribers to a specific channel of communication, in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds of suspicion for a link, even an indirect one, with child sexual abuse material, and which have been identified by the competent judicial authority;

15. Amendment 36 · Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1232Adopted

    Article 1 f (new)

    Tabled by Markéta Gregorová · Verts/ALE

    Added: Article1f Article -1c In Article 3(1), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, the following point is added: (ib) not applied to interpersonal communications to which end-to-end encryption is, has been or will be applied;