Vote in the European Parliament

European Central Bank – annual report 2025

Johan Van Overtveldt – Motion for a resolution (as a whole)
Date: 10.02.2026·Reference: A10-0002/2026
Rapporteur: Johan Van Overtveldt

Overall Result

Adopted
  • 443 For
  • 71 Against
  • 117 Abstention
  • 87 Did not vote
Status and procedure

Outcome as recorded by the European Parliament.

Vote held on
Latest recorded step
Plenary · (301 days ago)
Next scheduled step
No further step is scheduled in the source.

Procedure timeline

2025/2182(INI) · INI

Recorded procedure activities. These do not establish whether a law has entered into force.

  1. Recorded: Referral5 days until the next step
  2. Recorded: Committee stage94 days until the next step
  3. Latest recorded: Plenary301 days since this step began
Recorded activities (18)
  1. Referral to committee
  2. Committee report tabled
  3. Committee amendments tabled
  4. Committee report adopted
  5. Tabling for plenary
  6. Tabling for plenary
  7. Tabling for plenary
  8. Tabling for plenary
  9. Tabling for plenary
  10. Tabling for plenary
  11. Tabling for plenary
  12. Tabling for plenary
  13. Tabling for plenary
  14. Tabling for plenary
  15. Tabling for plenary
  16. Plenary debate
  17. Plenary vote
  18. Plenary vote results
Scheduled activities (not confirmation of completion)
  1. Plenary debate
  2. Plenary vote

Procedure file (OEIL) · European Parliament data
Retrieved:

Sources

Data: EP Open Data API

What is this about?

  • The report assesses the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy for 2025, emphasizing price stability as its primary objective.
  • It critiques the ECB’s delayed response to post-pandemic inflation and calls for a cautious, data-driven approach to monetary easing.
  • The independence of the ECB is underscored as crucial, while greater transparency and accountability to the European Parliament are demanded.
  • The gradual reduction of government bond purchase programs and avoiding market distortions are highlighted as key priorities.
  • Additionally, the report stresses the importance of financial stability and the euro’s international role.
Source: Explanatory Statement (AI Generated)

Amendment history (20)

Wording as published by the EP, in English.

  1. Amendment 2Adopted

    Paragraph 9 a (new)

    Tabled by Jussi Saramo, Manon Aubry · The Left

    Added: 9a. Expresses concern over the high cost of living, as food and energy prices have increased in Europe since the COVID-19 pandemic; notes that, on average, the price of a meal in the euro area in 2025 was one third higher than before the pandemic1a, and that this has particularly affected low-income households. 1a European Central Bank blog, ‘When groceries bite, the role of food prices for inflation in the euro area’, 25 September 2025.

  2. Amendment 3Rejected

    Paragraph 9 b (new)

    Tabled by Jussi Saramo · The Left

    Added: 9b. Notes that national inflation rates can vary significantly within the euro area, with some countries suffering from deflationary rather than inflationary pressures, which can further harm the economy;

  3. Amendment 4Rejected

    Paragraph 27

    Tabled by Jussi Saramo, Manon Aubry · The Left

    27. Removed: Supports the ECB in its efforts to accommodate Added: Calls on the ECB to reduce the EU’s financial dependence on US assets by strengthening the international role of the Removed: euro through, inter alia, sufficient currency swap and repo lines; Added: euro; calls on the ECB to be prepared for a possible ‘sell America’ scenario, in which public and private institutions would sell off US assets on a large scale in the context of increasing US aggression;

  4. Amendment 5Rejected

    Paragraph 28 a (new)

    Tabled by Charlie Weimers, Dick Erixon, Beatrice Timgren · ECR

    Added: 28a. Emphasises in this context that every Member State has the right to decide whether to adopt the euro;

  5. Amendment 7Adopted

    Paragraph 6 a (new)

    Tabled by Anouk Van Brug, Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu · Renew

    Added: 6a. Echoes the statement of solidarity with regard to the US Federal Reserve made by the ECB and central banks worldwide underlining the importance of preserving central bank independence, with full respect for the rule of law and democratic accountability.

  6. Amendment 13Rejected

    Recital H a (new)

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    Added: Ha. whereas the convergence criteria are mathematical – not political – rules designed to prevent instability in the euro area, support price stability and act as a protector of people’s purchasing power and wealth; whereas the 3 % budget deficit rule is the mathematical upper limit to a sustained deficit so as to at least ensure the mere mathematical possibility of repayment of debt (no-Ponzi scheme condition) without resorting to higher inflation, while this calculated limit was based on the substantially stronger economic growth levels of the 1990s; whereas the breaking of the deficit criterion for various political reasons has become normal and now even institutionalised in the EU, while financial markets will only consider mathematical – not political – reasoning for their price and interest evaluation of sovereign bonds;

  7. Amendment 19Rejected

    Paragraph 2

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    … a prerequisite for it to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price stability; Added: criticises the fact that the ECB relies exclusively and blindly on a body subordinate to the Commission, Eurostat, to obtain a variety of essential data on which it bases its monetary policy and steers the euro, as in practice this undermines its independence, as its policy is reliant on data provided by a body subordinate to the Commission;

  8. Amendment 22Rejected

    Paragraph 6

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    … 130 TFEU; emphasises that independence requires the ECB’s actions to remain apolitical; Added: reiterates that the economic rationale behind Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB is to prohibit the ECB from being used, directly or indirectly, to finance government spending by the Member States on the basis of political objectives; calls on the ECB to inform Parliament whether there have already been discussions within the board of the ECB to restart future asset purchase programmes, in order to counteract possible strong increases in interest rates on sovereign bonds caused by the current excessive spending of several Member States and the national escape clause;

  9. Amendment 23Rejected

    Paragraph 6 a (new)

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    Added: 6a. Strongly recommends the decentralisation of the ECB’s sources of macroeconomic input data, as well as the creation and use of intrinsic means for the continuous monitoring of potential systematic problems with such data, since it is so crucial for the formulation of its monetary policy and the monitoring of its primary objective;

  10. Amendment 24Rejected

    Paragraph 6 b (new)

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    Added: 6b. Points out the feasibility and statistical necessity, after more than two decades, of reviewing Eurostat’s key annual macroeconomic data by comparing compound annual macroeconomic growth and inflation figures with data from other sources using considerably longer time intervals than the current yearly intervals, in order to identify problems, systematic distortions or errors; stresses that errors or bias in annual data are difficult to detect, but if consistent or systematic bias or errors exist, this would become apparent over such longer periods, which now exist after more than two decades; calls on the ECB to carry out such statistical investigations and checks to ensure that it is steering the euro with an unbiased compass;

  11. Amendment 27Rejected

    Paragraph 8 a (new)

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    Added: 8a. Considers that the strong increase in money supply in the decade prior to the surge in inflation, which was mainly due to the zero interest-rate policy, the asset purchase programmes and, in particular, the sharp increase in money supply immediately prior to the surge, i.e. during the COVID-19 emergency measures, combined with the sudden increase in the velocity of money following the end of the COVID-19 restrictions, as well as the sudden supply contraction of essential resources as a result of EU sanctions, created a textbook case for a predictable sharp surge in inflation due to the neutrality of money;

  12. Amendment 28Rejected

    Paragraph 9

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    … easing monetary policy should be prudent, data-driven and guided by price stability; Added: expresses concern about Member States’ increasing debt levels, their excessive deficit spending and the ensuing predictable effect on interest rates in several Member States, which will lead to renewed demands for ECB intervention with fresh money to lower interest rates via asset purchases, which in turn would result in increased monetary-induced price inflation in the years to come;

  13. Amendment 29Rejected

    Paragraph 10 a (new)

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    Added: 10a. Highlights that the so-called ‘cost-of-living crisis’ is just another term for the significant decline in the general population’s purchasing power, while monetary inflation and a low-growth environment are generally among the main economic causes of such declines; points out that inflation adjustments often at best only raise wages up to the officially reported level, such that if inflation is systematically under-reported, this would result in a sustained decline in real wages; points to the link between sustained expansionary monetary policy and property prices, and subsequently housing prices, in a fiat money system;

  14. Amendment 30Rejected

    Paragraph 12

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    12. Stresses that the ECB’s purchase programmes are Removed: unconventional Added: highly questionable monetary policy tools Removed: that have side effects; notes in particular that asset purchase programmes can distort price signals; Added: undermining the principle of monetary dominance by indirectly financing excessive government spending via the downward manipulation of bond prices, and thus debt costs, at the expense of future price stability and, consequently, the real wealth and purchasing power of the entire population of the euro area; notes that the ECB started shrinking its balance sheet only very gradually; …

  15. Amendment 32Rejected

    Paragraph 18 a (new)

    Tabled by Rada Laykova, Siegbert Frank Droese · ESN

    Added: 18a. Points out that the protracted period of low and zero interest rates over the last decade has undermined creative destruction and economic evolution, as it prevented inefficient companies from being forced to exit the market, because they were able to stay afloat by taking out very cheap loans, which ultimately contributed to the lack of competitiveness of the EU economy, since this undermined this vital evolutionary economic process and led to material and human resources being tied up by very inefficient companies (‘zombie companies’) that would otherwise have disappeared from the market long ago;

  16. Amendment 37Rejected

    Paragraph 20 a (new)

    Tabled by Auke Zijlstra, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón +4 · PfE

    Added: 20a. Highlights that environmental policy objectives should not be implemented using monetary policy tools;

  17. Amendment 38Rejected

    Paragraph 27 a (new)

    Tabled by Auke Zijlstra, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón +2 · PfE

    Added: 27a. Stresses that the ECB should also take into account the potential drawbacks of the euro having a stronger international role and being a global reserve currency, including its potential overvaluation;

  18. Amendment 39Rejected

    Paragraph 35

    Tabled by Auke Zijlstra, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón +2 · PfE

    35. Reiterates that the nominations to the ECB’s Executive Board should be Removed: gender-balanced, merit and ability-based, with shortlists submitted to Parliament, and that Removed: people of all genders Added: men and women should have equal opportunities to serve as governors of their respective national …

  19. Amendment 40Adopted

    Paragraph 22 a (new)

    Tabled by Pasquale Tridico, Alessandro Zan, Anouk Van Brug +45 · Members

    Added: 22a. Recalls that equal access to payment services is essential for participation in economic life; underlines that the increasing digitalisation of payments, if left exclusively to private and non-EU actors, risks creating new forms of exclusion for both users and merchants; stresses that an online and offline digital euro should contribute to safeguarding universal access to payments and broad acceptance by merchants across the EU, while fully respecting privacy and data protection standards;

  20. Amendment 41Adopted

    Paragraph 23

    Tabled by Pasquale Tridico, Alessandro Zan, Anouk Van Brug +45 · Members

    23. Removed: Takes note of Added: Welcomes the ongoing discussions on the digital euro; Added: underlines that, in a context of heightened geopolitical uncertainty and excessive dependence on non-EU payment infrastructures, the introduction of a digital euro, designed to complement cash and private banking services, is essential to strengthen EU monetary sovereignty, reduce fragmentation in retail payments and support the integrity and resilience of the single market;

Vote by political group

How the political groups voted

Members

Showing 10 of 718

Vote Position
NameCountryGroupVote Position
ItalyGUE/NGL
For
GermanyRenew
For
GermanyEPP
For
GermanyS&D
For
GermanyEPP
For
DenmarkS&D
For
SwedenGUE/NGL
For
NetherlandsEPP
For
LuxembourgEPP
For
PortugalRenew
For
Show more
Follow us on Instagram@checksomevotes@checksomevotes_en